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I RACIAL REPARATIONS:
JAPANESE AMERICAN REDRESS AND
AFRICAN AMERICAN CLAIMS
ERIC K. YAMAMOTO .:
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991 the United States Office of Redress Administration pre-
sented the first $20,000 reparations check to the oldest Hawai'i survi-
vor of the Japanese American internment camps. I attended the stately
ceremony. The mood, while serious, was decidedly upbeat. Tears of
relief mixed with sighs ofjoy. Freed at last.
Amidst the celebration I reflected on the Japanese American re-
dress process and wondered about its impacts over time. The process
had .been arduous, with twists and turns. Many Japanese Americans
contributed,' and their communities overwhelmingly considered repa-
rations a great victory, as did I.
Other racial groups lent support, often in the form of political
endorsements. Support also came as ringing oratory-for instance, the
moving speech on the floor of the House of Representatives by African
American Congressperson Ron Dellums.2 Yet some of the support
seemed begrudging. One African American scholar observed,
[tihe apology [to Japanese Americans] was so appropriate
and the payment so justified... that the source of my am-
bivalent reaction was at first difficult to identify: After some
introspection, I guiltily discovered that my sentiments were
related to a very dark, brooding feeling that I had fought long
Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i at Manoa. Mly
thanks to Lia Sheehan Dwight, An)-a Vohiri, Kiera Wong and Regan Iao for their valuable
assistance."
I See Takeshi Nakayma, Histoiic Chapter Closes, RAFu SHMPO, Aug. 10, 1998, 1, 3. Contribu-
tors to Japanese American redress included the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), the
National Coalition for Japanese American Redress, mnerous elected officials and grassroots
organizers.
2 See 133 CONG. RFc. H7555, H7576-47 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Del-
lums), 135 CoNG. REc. H7597, H7626-27 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dellums).
In support of an amendment to the Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990 concerning the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Dellums recalled:
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and hard to conquer-inferiority. A feeling that took first root
in the soil of "Why theni and not me."3
This *confession led me to ask about what political role Japanese
Americans might play in future struggles for racial justice in America.
That question then led to my essay in 1992 about the social meanings
ofJapanese American redriess. 4 The essay started with the recognition
thatJapanese American beneficiaries of reparations benefited person-
ally, sometimes profoundly. The trauma of racial incarceration, without
.charges or trial, and the lingering self-doubt over two generations left
scars on the soul. The government's apology and bestowal of symbolic
reparations fostered long overdue healing for many. As I observed
then, redress was:
cathartic for internees. A measure of dignity was restored.
Former internees could finally talk about the internment.
Feelings long repressed, surfaced. One woman, now in her
sixties, stated that she always felt the internment was wrong,
but that, after being told by the military, the President and
the Supreme Court that it was a necessity, she had come
seriously to doubt herself. Redress and reparations and the
recent successful court challenges, she said, had now freed
her soul.5
But, I wondered, what were the long-term societal effects of repa-
rations-the social legacy of Japanese American redress beyond per-
sonal .benefits? Would societal attitudes toward Asian Americans and
other racial minorities change? Would institutions, especially those that
curtailed civil liberties in the name of national security, be restruc-
I participated in the debate that gave rise to de authorizing legislation. For some
of us in this Chamber, that was a very painful debate for me, a very emotional
debate. Hopefully, for all of us it was a debate full of principle[,] integrity and
compassion....
Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the amendment before us. This is a matter of high
principle, and those of its who recall the debate on the floor remember there were
tears in the House Chambe; and there tas conflict, agony, and pain in this
Chamber.
135 CONG. REc. H7595--02, H7626-27 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dellums).
3 Arncene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, W1ear It: An Analysis of Reparations to Aftican Americans,
67 TuL. L Rnv. 597, 647 (1993).
4 See generally Eric K. Yamanmoto, Fiend, Foe or SomethingElse: Social Meanings of Rediass and
Reparations, 20 DEN,.J. INT'L L & PoL'v 223 (1992) [hereinafter Social Meanings of Redress]. See
also Sarah L Brew, Note, MakingAmendsforHistoy: Legislative ReparationsforJapanese Ameicais
and Other Minori Groups, 8 LAw & INEQ. J. 179 (1989); Tyron J. Sheppard & Richard Nevins,
Constitutional'Equali,/Reparations At Last, 22 U. WVEST LA. L. RE%,. 105 (1991).
5 Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 4, at 227.
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tured? Would Japanese American reparations serve as a catalyst for
redress for others?
I identified and critiqued two emerging and seemingly contradic-
tory views of reparations for Japanese Americans and then offered a
third. The first view was that redress demonstrates that America does
the right thing, that the Constitution works (if belatedly) and that the
United States is far along on its march to racial justice for all. I
criticized that view as unrealistically bright.
The criticism is not that reparations are insignificant for re-
cipients; the criticism is that they can lead to an "adjustmnent
of individual attitudes" towards the historical injustice of the
internment without giving current "consideration to the fun-
damental realities of power." The "danger lies in the possibil-
ity of enabling people to 'feel good' about each other" for
the moment, "while leaving undisturbed the attendant social
realities" creating the underlying conflict.6
The second view was that "reparations legislation has the potential
of becoming a civil rigi~ts law that at best delivers far less than it
promises and that at worst creates illusions of progress, functioning as
a hegemonic device to preserve the status quo."7 I criticized that view
as overly dark.
As part of this critique, and drawing upon critical race theory
insights, I offered a third view.
[R] eparations legislation and court rulings in cases such as
[the] Korematsu [corani nobis case] do not... inevitably lead
to a restructuring of governmental institutions, a changing of
societal attitudes or a transformation of social relationships,
and the dangers of illusory progress and co-optation are real.
At the same time, reparations claims, and the rights discourse
they engender in attempts to harness the power of the state,
can and should be appreciated as intensely powerful and
calculated political acts that challenge racial assumptions un-
derlying past and present social arrangements. They bear
potential for contributing to institutional and attitudinal re-
structuring....s
G1d. at 231-32 (citations omitted) (quoting Ednionds, Beyond Prejudice Reduction, MCS
CONCILiATION Q., Spring 1991, at 15).
7 rd. at 229.
81d. at 233. The Koremnatsu coram nobis litigation in 1983-84 reopened the United States
Supreme Court's decision in tie original Koematsu case in 1944 which upheld the constitution-
40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 477
In light of this third view, I posited that the social meaning of
Japanese American redress was yet to be determined. I suggested that
the key to the legacy of redress was how Japanese Americans acted
when faced with continuing racial subordination of African Americans,
Native Americans, Native Hawaiians, Latinas/os and Asian Americans.
Would we draw upon the lessons of the reparations movement and
work to end all forms of societal oppression, or would we close up shop
because we got ours?
Six years have passed. During that time, the United States, indeed
the world, has gone apology crazy. Japanese American redress has
stimulated a spate of race apologies. Some apologies appear to reflect
heartfelt recognition of historical and current injustice and are backed
by reparations. Other apologies appear empty, as strategic maneuvers
to release pent-up social pressure. 9
Amidst this phenomenon African Americans have renewed their
call for reparations for the legally sanctioned harms of slavery and Jim
Crow oppression. These renewed claims have gained momentum, per-
haps more so than at any time since Reconstruction-when Congress
and the President sought to confiscate Southern land and provide
fieed slaves with forty acres and a mule.'0 The Florida legislature re-
cently approved reparations for survivors and descendants of the 1923
Rosewood massacre." The African American victims of the Tuskegee
syphilis experiment received reparations and a presidential apology in
1997.12 One reparations lawsuit was filed on the West Coast and a repa-
rations class action is contemplated on the East Coast.13 Representative
John Conyers' resolution calling for a Congressional Reparations Study
ality of the internment. Korematsu %r U.S., 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D.Cal. 1984). Based on recently
discovered World War II documents showing the absence of military necessity for the internment
and the Justice Department's wilful misrepresentations to tie Court, the federal district court
found a manifest injustice and set aside Fred Korematsn's conviction for refusing to abide by the
military's exclusion orders. See id. at 1417.
9 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RAcE & JusT. 47 (1997) [hereinafter
Race Apologies].
10 SeeSalini Muiakkil, Does Anzedca Owe Blads Reparations, IN THESE TmUS,June 30, 1997
(describing mounting community activism in support of reparations). See also Verdun, supra note
3, at 600 (describing five African American reparations movehlents since the Civil War).
n In 1995, each of the nine African American survivors of the mayhem as a result ofa white
woman's false rape charge was awarded $150,000 in reparations; the descendants of Rosewood
residents received between $375 and $22,535 for loss of property. See Lori Robinson, Righting a
Wroang Among Blad Ameicans: The Debate is Escalating over Whether an Apology for Slavery is
Enough,5'SEArx= POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3200157.
12 See Apologize but Don't Forget, AuSTIN Am-ERICAN-STATESMAN, May 16, 1997, available in
1997 WL 2822680.
13 See infia note 116 (describing the 1995 California case, Cato v. United States, 70 F3d 1103,
1110 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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Commission, reintroduced every year since 1989, has garnered en-
dorsements from an impressive array of political organizations.1 4
And in every African American reparations publication, in every
legal argument, in almost every discussion, the topic of Japanese
American redress surfaces.' 5 Sometimes as legal precedent. Sometimes
as moral compass. Sometimes. as political guide. In similar fashion,
Native Hawaiian reparations claims against the United States for the
illegal overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation in 1893, and against
the State of Hawai'i for mismanagement of Hawaiian trust lands, 6 also
cite reparations for Japanese Americans.
In light of recent reparations history and contemporary claims,
the diverging views of Japanese American redress and the February
1999 closure of the Office of Redress Administration' 7 the time is ripe
14 See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 105th
Cong. (1997). Groups supporting this bill include the NAACP, tie Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, the city councils of Cleveland, Detroit, and Inglewood and the Council of Inde-
pendent Black Institutions. See Robinson, supra note 11.
15 See DEr.Ric A. BEL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AERICAN LAW 51 (2d ed. 1980); Merdun,
supra note 3.
16 Current Hawaiian claims for reparations are divided into both court and legislative claims
against both the federal and state governments. Examples of court claims against the state
government include: Office of Hawaiian Affhirs r State of Hawaii, Civ. No. 94-0205-01, appeal
dodteld, No. 20281 (1998) (the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, created by the Hawai'i Constitution
to represent Native Hawaiians, has asserted claims to back payinent of one-fifth of ceded land
trust revenues, over $1 billion; the case is on appeal to tie Supreme Court of Hawai'i); Ka'ai'ai
v. Drake, Civ. No. 92-3742-10 (1st Cir. 1992) (after successful lobbying, the 1995 legislature
committed S20 million a year for 20 years, $600 million total, to the Homelands Trust); Kealoha
. Hee, Civ. No. 94-0118-01 (1st Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs sought to enjoin negotiations, settlement,
and the execution of release by trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs "concerning claims against
the United States for the overthrow of tie Hawaiian government in 1893, and tie redress of
breaches of the ceded lands trust committed by tie United States and tie State of Hamai'i")..
Examples of legislative reparations proposals include: The Aboriginal Lands of Haaiian
Ancestr); Inc. Association ("ALOHA") (during tie 1970s ALOHA called attention to the United
States involvement in the overthrow of tie Hawaiian government; their efforts resulted in the
introduction of a series of reparations bills into Congress, bringing attention to Native Hawaiian
claiiiis on a federal and state level); The Native Hawaiian Autonomy Act, H.B. 98-0270-1, 19th
Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Haw 1997) (the bill proposed the creation of Native Hawaiian Trust
Corporation to assume the assets, liabilities and responsibilities currently held by the state as
trustees for Native Hamaiians; in tie flce of stiff Hawaiian political opposition, the legislation
died); The Native Hawaiian Plebiscite, 1996 Haw. Sess. Lairs 140 (to acknowledge aiid recognize
the unique status tie Native Hawaiian people bear to the State of Hawaii and to the United States
and to hold an election allowing Native Hawaiians to decide whether to set up a constitutional
convention establishing an indigenous sovereign government); Senator Daniel Akaka's commit-
inent to introducing legislation in Congress. See Pete Pichaske, HONOLULU STAR BuLLET, July
14, 1998 (describing Akaka's proposed advisory committee of tribal leaders and indigenous
peoples to address Native Hawaiian self-determination rights). See generally NATivE HAwAiIAN
RlGrrs HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 1991).
17The ORA ended its service on February 5, 1999. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 1989(b-3).
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to revisit the legacy of Japanese American redress. As part of that
inquiry, it is also time to assess whatJapanese American redress means
to racial reparations movements for others.
In this essay I examine aspects ofJapanese American reparations
history and the current reparations debates and offer the beginnings
of a conceptual framework for inquiring into, critiquing and guiding
ongoing reparations efforts in the United States. The framework I offer
operates from a specific vantage point: groups seeking reparations.
The framework, however, does not address "how to get reparations" so
much as "how to think about the reparations process with all its poten-
tial and risk." Its utility lies in helping groups frame concepts, craft
language and determine strategy in deciding whether to embark on a
reparations journey and what to anticipate along the way.'8
More specifically, Section II of this essay surveys the terrain of
recent race apologies and reparations and asks about the extent of
Japanese American support for other groups currently seeking redress
for historical injustice. Section III asks what lessons, bright and dark,
might be drawn from the political and legal processes of Japanese
Anerican redress. It begins with the assumption that reparations usu-
ally have salutary impact upon recipients and that in certain situations
reparations can be transformative for groups struggling against oppres-
sion. The section then focuses on the underside of that assumption, a
darker side often only minimally explored during legislative lobbying,
court suits, community demonstrations and media presentations-a
darker side often overlooked amid the hot rhetoric justifying repara-
tions.
That underside is comprised of the risks of reparations efforts-
the hidden dangers of entrenched victim status, image distortion,
mainstream backlash, interminority friction and status quo enhance-
ment. Drawing from experiences of Japanese American redress and
the current African American and Native Hawaiian reparations move-
18 1n discussingJapanese American redress and African American and, to a lesser extent,
indigenous Hau,aiian reparations claims, I am not passingjudgment about die comparative value
or priority of racial group reparations claims. Nor is m), decision in this essay to not address in
deptl reparations claims of other groups (such as various Native American tribes; see infra note
22) meant to diminish the importance of those claims. In saying this, I am not suggesting that
all group reparations claims are the same. Groups have experienced oppression differently, and
every serious discussion of reparations should acknowledge the uniqueness and moral strength
of African American claims (due to slavery and Jim Crow apartheid) and indigenous peoples'
claims (due to physical and cultural genocide). See generally Eric IL Yamamoto, Relhinldng
Alliances Agency, Responsibili, and Interaciaijustice, 3AsIAN PAc. Amt. LJ. 33 (1995) [hereinafter
RethinkingAlliances] (describing how groups are "differentially racialized," giving rise to differing
group identities, living conditions and claims).
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ments, and for the sake of simplicity, I cast this underside, the risks, in
three ways. The first is the distorted legal framing of reparations claims;
the second, the dilemma of reparations process; and the third, the
ideology of reparations.
Section IV assesses pending African American reparations claims
in light of these concerns. Finally, in the context of future claims,
Section V offers an expanded view of reparations not as compensation,
but as "repair"--the restoration of broken relationships through jus-
tice.
II. JAPANESE AMERICAN AND OTHER REDRESS MOVEMENTS
Movements to redress historical racial injustice mark the global
landscape. These movements are part of the Japanese American re-
dress legacy.19 Internationally, the Canadian government recently apol-
ogized to and promised substantial reparations for Canada's indige-
nous peoples for destruction of their culture and way of life; the British
offered reparations to New Zealand's Maori for British-initiated 19th
century bloody race wars; French President, Jacques Chirac, recog-
nized French complicity in the deportation of 76,000 Jews to death
camps; the Catholic Church apologized for its assimilationist policy in
Australia that contributed to the Aborigines' spiritual and cultural
destruction. Still unresolved are the claims of the Korean "comfort
women" forced into prostitution by the Japanese government.2 °
Nationally, President Clinton apologized to indigenous Hawaiians
for the illegal U.S.-aided overthrow of the sovereign nation and the
near decimation of Hawaiian life that followed; the Methodist Church
apologized to Native Americans in Wyoming for the 1865 post-treaty
slaughter at the hands of the U.S. cavalry led by a Methodist minister;
the Florida legislature awarded reparations to survivors of mayhem at
Rosewood; and the federal government offered reparations to the
African American victims of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment and
agreed to apologize to and provide limited reparations for Japanese
Latin Americans kidnapped from Latin American countries and placed
in U.S. internment camps as hostages during W IVI. 21 Claims that are
19The following are brief descriptions of recent national and international apologies and
reparations catalogued in greater detail in Yammoto, Race Apologies, supra note 9, at 68 app.
21) See Japanese Court Rules in Favor of "GComfort Women" (1isited Apr. 27, 1998) <http://wwI.
cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9804/27/japan.conifort>.
21 See Caroline Ao)mgi, Bittersveet VitoDyforJapanese Latin Americans: After 57 1"aem, Former
hIternees to Receive Apology and $5,000 Redress Payment from United States, P.AciFc Crr.zE,,June
19-July 2,1998, at 1.
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still pending include: Native Hawaiian claims for land and money
reparations from the U.S. and the State of Hawai'i, Native American
reparations claims for treaty violations by the U.S.2 2 and African Ameri-
can slavery-based reparations claims.23
The political movements supporting these reparations claims have
been bolstered by the reality of Japanese American redress. Yet the
larger questions asked six years ago remain. First, in what ways have
Japanese Americans, as an exercise of group agency, engaged in these
recent and ongoing reparations efforts of others? Have the Japanese
Anericans-community and legal organizations, media, politicians,
educators-lent organizational help and political and legal muscle to
the movements of others?24 Or, have they sat back and said, "you're on
your own?1 25 Second, to what extent havejapanese Americans engaged
with other Asian American groups26 and other communities of color
* --The United States government has attempted to redress its past transgressions against
Native Americans through reparations. Examples of past reparations for appropriation of land
and other resources include: $81 million to the Klamaths of Oregon; $105 million to the Sioux
of South Dakota; $12.3 million to the Seminoles of Florida; $31 million to the Chippewas of
Wisconsin; and $32 million to tie Ottouas of Michigan. See Malik Russell, The Afiican Holocaust,
Reparations and the Apologj, MICHIGAN CITzE, Nov. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WI 11677255;
see also Mike, Nemeth, Foigotten Tibes Search for Place in Histoy: ik-I-Allts Dwindles Samish
'Her to Stay,' SasT-rLE TiruFs, Jan. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3132581. The struggle for
reparations still continues. Present-day NativeAmerican claims for reparations include: the Hopi's
and Lenape's claims against museums pursuant to die Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3006 (1994) (any federally funded institution, including museums,
that has remains or artifacts from federally recognized tribes has the obligation to report the
objects to the specific tribes), Kisten Kromer, Denver Muhseum Returning 164 Artifacts to Hopi
Tibe, DENVER POST, May 23, 1998, available in 1998 WIL 6111706; the Lenape's claim for land
and reparations from tie city of Wildwood, NewJersey, ThomasJ. Fitzgerald, Indian Tibe Wants
Wildwood Back: Legal Battle over Casino Site Widens, THE RECORD (NJ), Mar. 21, 1998, available
in 1998 AM. 5799684; the Sioux Nation's claim to 1.3 million acres of federally unoccupied lands,
Susan Lope, Indian Giver The Illusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native American Land Claims,
23 Sw. U. L REv. 331, 358, (1994); and their Black Hills claim, see id. at 346; various claims for
hunting and fishing rights and sovereignty by the Cheyenne River Sioux, the Crow tribes and te
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, John S. Harbison, The Broken
Promise Land: An Essay on Native Amaican Tuibal Sovereignty Over Reservation Resources, 14 STAN.
ENvrL. LJ. 347 (1995).
2 See ifira notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
24 One example of organizational help is the Haiai'i Chapter of the Japanese American
Citizens League's endorsement of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement and its educational ses-
sions on Hamaiian history and the various forms of indigenous sovereignty. Interview with Alan
Murakamni, President of the Hawai'i Chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League, in
Honolulu, Hauai'i (Mam; 23, 1997). Of course, one important factor of engagement is the extent
io which other groups have asked Japanese Americans to participate.
25 See Sachi Seko, Remembering Walter Wegln, PACIFIC CITIZEN, June 19-July 2, 1998, at 7
("For most of us, interest in redress faded soon after President Reagan signed die 1988 Civil .
Liberties Act, a common attitude being, 'I've got mine.'").
26 More recent Asian American immigrant groups, including Vietnamese, Laotians, Hmong,
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on racial justice issues beyond reparations, such as anti-immigrant
legislation, the ending of affirmative action, the curtailment of welfare,
job discrimination, English-only proposals and hate violence?27
Of course, Japanese American activists have supported others in
their political struggles and have worked hard to forge multiracial
alliances. 28 Some reparations beneficiaries have pooled reparations
money to aid others struggling socially and economically.2 9
Nevertheless, the question persists: Why do some activists in cur-
rent reparations movements perceive that, as a whole,Japanese Ameri-
cans benefitting from redress have offered relatively little financial aid
and political and spiritual support to others in theirjustice struggles?30
Is this perception completely false? Or partially true? If it is false, why
does the perception exist? If true in some part, what are the explana-
tions, and what is the Japanese American response?
These questions engender complicated inquiries that encompass,
but also extend well beyond, present-day Japanese American political
activities. They entail detailed inquiry into past and present intergroup
Koreans, Filipinos and Cambodians, face poverty, discrimination and violence. SeeJeff Chang,
Housing Divided, Tragic Failures and Hopeful Successes in Public and Non-Profit Housing
Struggles to Integrate the Poor (describing violence against Vietnamese families in San Francisco
public housing project and tense interracial relations) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
27 See generally Kevin R.Jolmson, Race, the Immig'ation Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
"Aagic Minor" into the Heart ofDadcness, 73 IND. LJ. 1111 (1998).
28 Recent multiracial collaborations involvingJapanese Americans include: Challenging the
Anti-Inmigrant Backlash (educating lawyers in a grassroots campaign to defeat Proposition 187);
the Japanese American Citizens League with Native Americans (commemorating the achieve-
mients of Native Americans); Asian American Studies/LItino Workers collaboration (organizing
a Litino union at the New Otani Hotel in Los Angeles); Asian Pacific Islanders Against Proposi-
tion 187 (uniting 60 organizations to oppose the immigration law); the MultiCultural Collabora-
tive (working on affirmative action and school reform in Watts); APALC of Southern California
(providing Los Angeles Asian Pacific American community with multilingual legal services and
civil rights advocacy); Asian Pacific American Dispute Resolution Center (mediating services for
conflicts withdin Asian Pacific American communities and interracial conflicts); "A.K.A. Don
Bonus" (1995) (a film of a first generation working-class Cambodian family by filmmaker Spencer
Nakasako and Cambodian student Sokly "Don Bonus" Ny); the Encampment for Citizenship (a
non-profit youth service organization bringing together young people of various cultural and
class backgrounds to promote the ideals of equalit; social justice and democracy). See also Dean
Takehara, Nikkei in the Civil Rights Movement, Los ANGELES JAI'ANEs- DAILY Nmvs, Wednesday,
Feb. 3, 1997, No. 26,897 (discussing the bicultural efforts of Japanese and African Americans
opposing discrimination in ie 1950s and'60s including Yuri Kochiyama's political work with
Malcoln X).
'For example, fifteen families from Kahuku, Oahu, in .Hawai'i gave $20,000 from their
reparations amards to tile rural high school in their low-income area, the population of which is
predominantly Hauaiian, Samoan and Tongan American. SeeTino Ramirez, Past Laid to Rest with
School Gift, HONOLULU STAR BULLEN, June 30, 1998, at Al.
30 SeeYamamoto, Sodal Meanings of Redress, supra note 4, at 237, 241.
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relations. In brief, this inquiry may require digging into whether other
groups opposed the Japanese American internment at the time and
later supported Japanese American redress. For example, preliminary
research reveals an apparent lack of opposition by the National Asso-
ciation for. the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") to the
internment at the time. Although black journalists voiced dissent,
neither the NAACP nor any other African American organization
submitted an amicus brief when the Korematsu internment cases were
before the Supreme Court.31 Did this apparent historical lack of public
opposition to the violation of the civil liberties ofJapanese Americans,
when the NAACP was beginning to forge its civil rights strategy, create
an African American interest in later assisting in Japanese Americans'
struggles for redress? Consider the strong support forJapanese Ameri-
can redress in the 1980s by black congressional leaders.32
The inquiry into intergroup relations may also require digging
into and beyond the pervasive effects of white supremacy, into the
extent to whichJapanese Americans (and Asian Americans) have been
complicit in the subordination of African American communities over
the last fifty years. In present-day America, depending on the circum-
stances, racial groups can be simultaneously disempowered and em-
powered, oppressed and complicit in oppression, liberating and sub-
ordinating.3 Do Asian Americans, themselves subject to continuing
discrimination and negative stereotyping,3 have an obligation to aid
in the healing of African American communities culturally, spiritually
and economically?
These questions about Japanese American engagement with the
justice struggles of other racial groups, which I raise rather than seek
to answer in this essay, speak to a larger issue: Is Japanese American
reparations solely about redress for Japanese Americans? Or is it also
about racial justice for all?
31 See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745, 1780
(1989) ("Significantly, neither the NAACP nor any other predominantly black organization
submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in Korenatsit v. United States or the other
cases challenging the government's internment policy."). Id. See Korematsu v. United States, 383
U.S. 214 (1944). See also RICHARD DELGADO, THE CODMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC
TALES OF AM ERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 171 n.25 (1996). To place this
apparent inaction in context, the Japanese American Citizens League initially decided not to
oppose the internment (although it later submitted an amicus brief when the Hirabayashd case
was argued in 1943). In addition, the national office of the American Civil Liberties Union refused
to publicly oppose the internment. See PETER IRONS,JsTICE AT WAR 105-18 (1983).
32 See supra note 2.
3
'
3See generally Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 18.
34 SeeANGELo N. A-CHETA, RACE RIGHTS AND THE AsiANAMERICAN ExPERIENCE 7-10 (1998)
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As I did six years ago, I suggest that the response to these ques-
tions, and the mature legacy of Japanese American redress, is yet in
the making.
III. THE POTENTIAL UNDERSIDE OF REPARATIONS PROCESS
With this in mind, I turn to reparations process: What larger
lessons might communities of color in the United States draw fi-om
Japanese American redress? Most addressing this question talk about
how the government rectified a serious violation of constitutional lib-
erties and how a diverse racial community banded together to achieve
reparations legislation.35 These are important salutary lessons. Indeed,
I start with the premise that reparations can be beneficial and at times
transformative for recipients.
This essay, however, takes a different tack. It focuses on the under-
side of reparations process-a darker side requiring careful strategic
attention by those seeking reparations and requiring forthright ac-
knowledgement by those who have achieved them. To simplif , I iden-
tify three aspects of this underside: the distorted legal framing of
reparations claims, the dilemma of reparations process and the ideol-
ogy of reparations. My thesis is not that this underside diminishes the
significance of achieving reparations or forecloses future redress ef-
forts. Rather, I suggest that the risks caution careful strategic framing
of debate and action and anticipatory grappling with a reparations
movement's both bright and darker potential.
A. Legal Framing of Reparations Claims
The first aspect of the underside of reparations process is the
distorted legal framing of reparations claims. Reparations that repair
are costly.36 Meaningful reparations entail change. Change means the
loss of some social advantages by those more powerful. For these
reasons, those charged with repairing the harms always resist.
Opponents employ legalisms in two ways to aid their resistance.
First, they cite the sufficiency of existing laws. Since existing civil rights
("tie United States Commission on Cit Rights concluded that anti-Asian activity in the form of
iiolence, harassment, intimidation, and vandalism has been reported across the nation.") Id. at
7. 5 See, ag., JusTicE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THEJAI'ANESE AIERICAN INTERMENr CASas
(Peter Irons, ed. 1989).
-1 See iqfra Section V (describing the reframing of reparations from compensation to "re-
pair"--that is, the repairing of tears in the structural and psychological fabric of a society resulting
from the social and economic subordination of some of its members).
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laws already afford individuals equal opportunity, the argument goes,
there is no need for additional reparations legislation to rectify so-
cial inequalities.37 Second, those resisting reparations raise objections
shaped by narrow legal concerns. They argue the criminal law defense
of lack of bad intent on the part of wrongdoers; they assert the proce-
dural bar of lack of standing by claimants (the difficulty of identifying
specific perpetrators and victims); they cite the lack of legal causation
(specific acts causing specific injuries); and they cite the impossibility
of accurately calculating damages (or compensation).38
These concerns seem compelling to lawyers and judges because
they resonate with the common law paradigm of a lawsuit-where an
individual wrongfully harmed by the specific actions of another in the
recent past is entitled to recover damages to compensate for actual
personal losses. The typical situation is the pedestrian hit by a speeding
car. As Mari Matsuda observes, however, that paradigm works poorly
where, over time, members of a group act to preserve that group's
system of dominance and privilege by denigrating other groups and
excluding other groups' members from housing, businesses, jobs and
political and social opportunities; that is, situations of systemic racial
oppression.3 9
Yet, despite the misfit, the common law paradigm for reparations
persists. African Americans seeking reparations for slavery have tended
to frame their arguments according to traditional remedies law-that
reparations are a form of both payment for individual losses (just
compensation) and divestiture of ill-gotten gain (preventing unjust
enrichment).-40 This resort to traditional legal remedies makes some
sense at first glance. Compensation and unjust enrichment- are well-
recognized remedial principles, and they generally appear to fit the
circumstances of African American slavery-based claims.
In practical legal application, however, those traditional principles
erect inordinately high barriers. For instance, as Vincene Verdun ob-
serves, by casting reparations as a "claim for compensation based on
3 See Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to Afiican-
Ameican Reparations Theory in Mainstream and OutlsiderRemedies Discotrse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863,
906-07 (1993).
s Marl Matsuda has thoughtfully refuted the narrow common law paradigm-based objections
to reparations. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARv. C.R-C.L L R,. 323, 373-88 (1987) [hereinafter Looking to the Bottom]; CHARLES R.
LAWRENCE, HI & MARt J. MATSUDA, WE WVON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
AcTIoN 242 (1997).
39 See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 38, at 376.4 0 SeeVerdun, sup)a note 3, at 621.
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slavery," present-day African Americans are required to prove "that all
African Americans were injured by slavery and that all white Americans
caused the injury or benefitted from the spoils of slave labo" 4' The
courts legally, and mainstream America politically, have been unwilling
to accept this group victim/group perpetrator proposition. They con-
tinue to look instead for individual wrongdoers who inflict harm on
identifiable individuals, resulting in quantifiable damages. This search,
framed by the common law paradigm, undermines historical group-
based claims for the wrongs of slavery and Jim Crow segregation.42
Without a marked shift away from the individual rights/remedies
paradigm, reparations claims face formidable obstacles-unless the
circumstances, particulars and timing of the claims allow for recasting
those claims in traditional legal garb. For example, the Japanese Ameri-
can redress movement stalled in the late 1970s in part because former
internee claims lacked a traditional legal basis. Despite hindsight rec-
ognition of historical injustice, government decisionmakers opposed
to reparations cited the Supreme Court's 1944 constitutional valida-
tion of the internment in Ko-renatsu.43 The government argued there
was no legal claim and that, therefore, compensation could not be
awarded.44 Indeed, the Ho7ri45 class action case, filed in the early 1980s
on behalf of internees seeking monetary compensation for internment
losses, also ran aground on the shoals of legal procedure-the statute
of limitations.
The redress movement regained its political momentum in the
mid-1980s in part from the judiciary's rulings in the Korematsu 6 and
Hirabayas4i7 coram nobis cases. Those cases reopened the original
41 Id. at 630.42 See iifia Section IV for a detailed discussion.
43Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also James Kilpatrick, quoted by
Senator Thurmond in the Civil Liberties Act debates:
As the Supreme Court noted in the case of Korematsu v. United States, most of
tie internees were loyal Americans. But some were not. More than 5,000 of them
refused to swear allegiance to the United States and to renounce allegiance to tie
emperor. Several thousand evacuees requested repatriation toJapan.'It is allvery
well to say today that these citizens should have .received fair hearings, but in the
spring of 1942 we were involved in a desperate war for national survival. Due process
had to yield to the exigencies of the day.
134 CONG. REc. S4396-402 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988) (statement of Senator Thurmond quoting
James Kilpatrick).
44 See Korematsu Y. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
45Hohri v United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 782 F.2d
227 (1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F.2d 779 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
925 (1988).
46 See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
47 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9ti Cir 1987).
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World War II internment decisions by the Supreme Court on the basis
of declassified government documents. The federal courts found that
* during the war the Justice and War Departments had destroyed and
suppressed key evidence and lied to the Supreme Court about the
military necessity for the internment. These "factual findings" in spe-
cific cases, coupled with a congressional commission's similar conclu-
sions,48 provided the missing traditional legal cornerstone to the foun-
dation for Japanese American reparations claims.
Ultimately, Japanese Americans succeeded on their reparations
claims not because they transcended the individual rights paradigm,
but because they were able to fit their claims tightly within it. Consider
these facets of the internees' claim: (1) their challenge addressed a
specific executive order and ensuing military orders; (2) the challenge
was based on then-existing constitutional norms (due process and
equal protection); (3) both a congressional commission and the courts
identified specific facts amounting to violations of those norms; (4) the
claimants were easily identifiable as individuals (those who had been
interned and were still living); (5) the government agents were iden-
tifiable (specific military and Justice and.War Department Officials);
(6) these agents' wrongful acts resulted directly in the imprisonment
of innocent people, causing them injury; (7) the damages, although
uncertain, covered a fixed time and were limited to survivors; and
(8) payment meant finality. In the end, the traditional legal rights/
remedies paradigm bolstered rather than hindered the internees' re-
parations claims
For similar reasons, reparations awarded to African Americans
emerged from narrow legal claims of families and survivors of the 1923
Rosewood Massacre.4 9 In 1995, the State of Florida paid each of the
nine survivors $150,000 and each of the 145 descendants of residents
between $375 and $22,535.50 Framed in terms of property damage, the
Rosewood claims fit within the traditional individual rights paradigm.
The government perpetrators and. victims were identifiable, direct
causation was established, damages were certain and limited, and pay-
ment meant finality.
By contrast, and as developed further in Section IV, African Ameri-
can groups seeking broad redress for slavery andJim Crow segregation
48 See generally REPORT OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND IN-
TERNMIENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONALJUSTIcE DENIED 47-92 (1982) [hereinafter CRI[CReport].
49 See generally MicALn. D'ORso, LIKE JUDGMENT DAY: THE RuIN AND REDEMPTION OF A
TOWN CALLED ROSEWOOD (1996) (describing the Rosewood Massacre and reparations efforts).
50 See Robinson, L., supra note 11.
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have encountered considerable difficulty in casting their reparations
claims in terms of individual rights and remedies. Legally framed
claims for lost wages, liberty and property meet the slew of standard
legal objections identified earlier. Opponents of Afiican American
reparations point to: (1) the statute of limitations ("this all happened
over one hundred years ago");. (2) the absence of directly harmed in-
dividuals ("all ex-slaves have been dead for at least -a generation");
(3) the absence of individual perpetrators ("white Americans living to-
day have not injured African Americans and should not be required to
pay for the sins of their slave master forbearers"); (4) the lack of direct
causation ("slavery did not cause the present ills of ARfican American
communities"); (5) the indeterminacy of compensation amounts ("it
is impossible to determine who should get what and how much") 51
The strength of these legal objections impelled Boris Bittker in
his highly publicized book, Te Case for Black Reparations, to purposely
omit slavery as the basis for African American reparations. 52 His argu-
ment, which fashioned reparations as a civil rights claim under a
Reconstruction era statute (known as Section 1983), conceded insur-
mountable legal obstacles to reparations for the harms of slaver)y
Rather than challenging the appropriateness of framing black repara-
tions claims as narrow legal civil* rights claims, Bittker abandoned
slavery as the principal justification for reparations. He instead stressed
compensation for present-day societal discrimination. This argument
identified harmed individuals-living blacks experiencing discrimina-
tion. It identified perpetrators-Americans who operated government
and private institutions that supported discrimination in housing, edu-
cation and jobs. It linked present harm to contemporary acts whose
historical roots lay in legalized Jim Crow segregation. And the argu-
ment cast damages in terms of lost wages, property and economic
opportunities. Bittker framed his argument in this limited fashion to
characterize black reparations claims as recognized by law.53
Even this narrow legal framing, however, foundered in at least two
significant respects. First, the framing was still not narrow enough.
Issues such as governmental immunity and proof of racist intent of
government actors appeared to block current damage claims.54 Sec-
ond, and more significant, this framing reflected "a tactical loss [by]
51 Verdun, supra note 3, at 607.
- See generally BoRis I. Birxmr., THE CASE FOR BLAcR REPARATIONS (1973).53 See id.
54Seege erallyDerrickA. Bell,Jr., Disselion ofaDream, 9 HAR. C.R--C.L. L. Rv. 156, 159-60
(1974) hereinafter Dissection of a Dream] (reviewing Boais 1. Bi-rX R, THE CASE FOR BL~cK
REPARATIONS (1973)).
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excluding the slavery period: setting this voluntary limitation on cov-
erage sacrifices much of the emotional component that provides the
moral leverage for black reparations demands."55
Opponents of Native Hawaiian reparations cite similar legal ob-
jections. They contend that "[i]f there were now a legal right to repa-
rations the Hawaiians could have sued the U.S. government and won
years ago .... [T] here is now no legal remedy for the alleged moral
wrong."'56 These opponents thus deem reparations claims unavailing
because they perceive no legal wrong.57
Legal arguments against African American and Native Hawaiian
reparations often appear compelling when reparations claims are cast
narrowly withiin the traditional individual rights and remedies para-
digm. Indeed, for this reason, reparations critics continue to frame
reparations claims primarily in narrow legal terms. This does not mean
that African American and Native Hawaiian claims lack merit as justice
claims. It means that the narrow legal framing of those sweeping
reparations claims, based largely on a vast array of historical events,
carries heavy baggage.
That baggage does not counsel abandonment of legal claims and
court battles. Rather, it counsels a dual strategy. One strategic path
focuses on bite-sized legal claims, with limited numbers of claimants,
well-defined in time and place. This would resemble situationi like
Rosewood and Tuskegee and, to some extent, the internment, which
were framed in terms of individual rights and remedies. The second,
and simultaneous, strategic path recognizes the distortions of narrow
legal fi-aming. It therefore reconceptualizes law and litigation broadly
as key components of larger political strategies. This alternative path
means treating law and court process-regardless of formal legal out-
come-as generators of "cultural- performances" and as vehicles for
providing outsiders an institutional public forum. The strategy also en-
tails communicating counter-narratives to dominant stories about the
racial order and attracting media attention to help organize racial
5Id. at 158.
-6Patrick IV. Hanifin, Hawaiian Reparations: Nothing Los4 Nothing Owed, 17 HAwAII' Bj.
107, 107-08 (1982).
67By contrast, many Native Hawaiians seek redress for the U.S.-aided illegal overthrow of the
Hamaiian Nation.in 1893, which resulted in a loss of sovereignty and land. Because the Provisional
Government, which replaced the Queen, actively sought and eventually secured a treaty annexing
Haumi'i to the United States, proponents seeking redress contend that the United States and the
State of Hawai'i perpetrated the harn upon all Native Hauaiians. See generally NATIVE HAWAIJAN
RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 16.
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communities politically in support of more sweeping reparations
claims 8
As described in the concluding section, when law and court proc-
ess are recast in this fashion and when reparations claims are refinamed
within the law-based paradigm and beyond it in terms of moral, ethical
and political dimensions of "repair," reparations can address both
the improvement of present-day living conditions of a historically op-
pressed group and the healing of breaches in the larger social polity.
Under these circumstances, reparations claims can appear not only
justifiable but essential to the racial health of both communities of
color and the nation. This alternative firnework for reparations has
yet to gain a foundational hold in the rhetoric and strategy of repara-
tions movements. Narrow legal fiaming of reparations claims contin-
ues to dominate, allowing opponents to hide their underlying social
arnd political objections.
What are the opponent's objections? Money. Critics are wondering
where reparations resources will come from, and if reparations suf-
ficient to "do justice" will disrupt the economy. Power. They are calcu-
lating how reparations can be shaped and conveyed in ways that will
advance the interests of mainstream America. Privilege. Critics ques-
tion whether reparations will alter the existing racial order.5 9
These objections by dominant interests suggest a need for concern
about reparations' likely impacts. Will the benefits to recipients have
lasting, or only temporary, effect? Will the reparations process reopen
or exacerbate old wounds, inflaming rather than healing? Will there
be social and political backlash against reparations beneficiaries and
political leaders, not only by disgruntied dominant group members but
also by marginalized groups who have not received reparations?
Collectively, these questions raise serious concerns worthy of care-
ful consideration in every situation where reparations claims are con-
templated. In most instances, no clear answers will be forthcoming.
Although there is no simple way to cut through the morass of questions
and concerns, I suggest merging them into two additional conceptual
categories to facilitate practical exploration by those engaged in repa-
rations movements. Those .categories are the dilemma of reparations
and the ideology of reparations.
53 See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Moses Haia & Donna Kalama, Courts and the Cultural
Pafonnanc" Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law dights to Sue, 16 U. HA . L RFv.
1 (1994) [hereinafter Cultural Perfonnance] (describing courts in handling indigenous peoples'
claims as potential sites and generators of "cultural performances"); DELGADO, supra note 31
(describing this approach generally as "legal instrumentalism").
59 See generally Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 38.
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B. Dilemma of Reparations
The dilemma of reparations is the second aspect of the darker
side of reparations.60 Reparations, if thoughtfully conceived, offered
and administered, can be transformative. They can help change mate-
rial conditions of group life and send political messages about socie-
tal- commitment to principles of equality. When reparations stimulate
change, however, they also generate resistance. Proponents suffer back-
lash. Thus, when reparations claims are treated seriously, they tend to
recreate victimhood by inflaming old wounds and triggering regressive
reactions.61 This is the dilemma of reparations.
Seeing these dual possibilities in all redress movementsJoe Singer
describes the potential for further victimization in two contemporary
sitiations. He recounts Jews' highly publicized demands in 1997 that
Swiss banks account for and restore Jewish money and gold held by
the banks for Nazis during World War 11.62 Bank acknowledgment and
restitution treats Jews as worthy human beings with rights, including
the right to own property. Restitution counters the anti-Semitic myth
ofJews misappropriating the property of others. Jewish "victimhood is
acknowledged, butJews are not treated as mere victims, but as agents
calling the Swiss banks to account.....1-63
One problem, however, is that Jewish demands for monetary res-
titution resurrect for some the harsh historical stereotypes ofJews "as
money-grubbing, as having both accumulated secret bank accounts in
the past and as caring now about nothing more than money.... ,,64
Another, and broader, problem is that additional Jewish reparations
claims may spark resentment among other groups whose reparations
claims have gone unmet (such as Hungarian gypsies who were exter-
minated by Nazis in Auschwitz and elsewhere).05
Singer also describes reparations demands for African Ameri-
cans.66 Some understand those demands as a call for redress of past
injustice; others understand the demands as a "refusal to grow up."67
60 See generally Joseph William Singer, Reparation (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
61 See id. at 3-4.
6 See id. at 3. See also Lance Morrow, The Justice of the Calculator, TME, Feb. 24, 1997, at 45.
6 Singe; supra note 60, at 3.64Id. at 3. See alsoJohanna Mcgeary et a., Echoes of the Holocaust: The Effort to RecoverJevish
Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks Before and Dining the War has rwn into a Bitter Crtsade that
Dredges Up the Horrors of the Past, TalE, Feb. 24, 1997, at 36.
6 See, e.g., Alex Bundy, Gypsies Demand Compensation for Suffering Duiing Holocaust, HONo-
LULU ADWERTISER, Aug. 4, 1997, at A10.
c' See Singe; supra note 60, at 4.67 Id.
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The result, evident in the volatile affirmative action debates, is that
"calls to repair the current effects of past injustice are met with derisory
denials that continuing injustice exists and that the problems of Af-i-
can Americans are now purely of their own making."3 As Singer ob-
serves about mixed healing potential in both situations, the "very thing
that restoration is intended to combat may be the result of the demand
* for restoration."69
There aie other examples of the reparations dilemma. In 1970
James Forman interrupted Sunday services at the Riverside church in
New York to demand 500 million dollars from America's churches and
synagogues for the oppression of blacks. 70 He demanded the "begin-
ning of the reparations due us as people who have been exploited and
degraded, brutalized, killed and persecuted."7' The backlash against
Forman and his "Black Manifesto" was swift and strong. Many were ap-
palled at the idea. Others, who agreed in concept, criticized Forman's
tactics. Among this latter group were African American churches that
acknowledged continuing racism against blacks and pledged money
for church programs to uplift blacks, while stipulating that none of the
money could go to Forman or his supporters.72 Forman, who issued
the challenge to repair the degradation, felt exploited and persecuted.
The dilemma of reparations process, the dual realities, also played
out in the United Church of Christ, Hawai'i Conference redress proc-
ess. The Hawai'i Conference of the United Church of Christ proposed
and eventually approved a plan to apologize to Native Hawaiians for
its predecessor's participation in the overtluow of the Hawaiian Nation
in 1893 and to offer monetary reparations. The arduous process took
several years.73
Serious discussion of reparations within the Hawai'i Conference
raised a host of serious fears.74 Amid fractious debate at the 1993
Conference's annual meeting, some delegates called for a halt to the
process to stop the bleeding.75 Both missionary descendants and Ha-
waiian church members expressed fears about tearing apart the Con-
G Id.
.Id. at 3.
"oSeCJAM.S FORtMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK REVOLuTIONARIES 543-50 (1972).
71James Forman, Black Manifesto Delivered to the W'hite Christian Churches and theJewish
Synagogues in the United States of America and All Other Racist Institutions (Apr. 26, 1969),
reprined in BiTFT-ER, supra note 52, app. A at 168.
7 See ARNOLD SCHUCHTER, REPARATIONS: THE BLACK MANIFESTO AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
WHITE AMERICA 7-13 (1970); Forman, supra note 71, at 548.
7 See Yamanioto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 18, at 39, 74.
74 See generally ERIC I. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIALJUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AmERICA (1999).
7 See id.
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ference by reopening (and not healing) one hundred year-old wounds.
Others hinted at possibilities for renewed betrayal-where the Confer-
ence would regain Hawaiian churches' trust, revisit the pain and then,
due to internal backlash, disappoint once again. Still others worried
about reinforcing negative stereotypes of Hawaiians still unable to lift
themselves up.
In addition to illuminating the angst of the reparations process-a
fear of replicating the very injuries reparations are designed to heal-
the dilemma of reparations also partially explains the disappointed
expectations of some Hawaiian community leaders. Those leaders criti-
cized Conference redress priorities that directed reparations primarily
to Hawaiian Churches and not community organizations. The leaders
asked, in effect, why them and not us, why so much for the churches
and so little for the rest.70
The dilemma also played out-but in ' different way-afterJapa-
nese American redress. Since past governmental sin had been ab-
solved, Asian Americans were once again permissible targets for the
government and mainstream America.7 The President and Congress
criticized Japanese competition in the auto industry and extensive
Japanese real estate purchases in the United States.78 Asian immigrants
became a target of popular initiatives like California's Proposition 187
and federal welfare reforms. They were blamed for America's de-
pressed economy, inadequate public education and other social ills.70
The recent congressional investigation into campaign finance tarred
with the taint of "yellow peril" not only Asian nationals and immigrants,
but also all American citizens of Asian ancestry.80 Some believe that
although the redress process educated many about the historical injus-
tice, reparations, combined with a feeling that "now the system works,"
also let the government off the hook so that it no longer needed to
vigorously oppose racism against Asian Americans.
The transformative potential of reparations is therefore linked,
ironically, to dissatisfaction and risk. Reparations for some does not
necessarily presage reparations for deserving others. Reparations for
one group may stretch the resources or political capital of the giver,
precluding immediate reparations (or enough reparations) for oth-
76 See id.
7- See Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 4, at 236.
78 See id.
79 See id.
60 See, g., Maria Puzente & Richard Price, Asian-Americans Fight Scandal-Linked Bias, USA
TODAY, Oct. 13, 1997, at A3.
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ers.s' The very dynamic of reparations process, even where salutary for
recipients, can generate backlash and disappointment.
C. Ideology of Reparations
The third aspect of the underside of reparations process is the
ideology of reparations. Reparations ideology is illuminated by Derrick
Bell's interest-convergence thesis. 82 Bell's thesis suggests that dominant
groups only recognize "rights" of minorities when the recognition of
those rights benefits the dominant group's larger interests. That is, a
government will rarely simply do the right thing; rather, it is likely to
confer reparations only at a time and in a manner that furthers the
interests of those in political power. 3
Rhonda Magee employs the interest-convergence thesis to explain
why African Americans have not received reparations for slavery. She
observes that, "[s]elf-interested whites who must make the ultimate
decision on whether or not to transfer property (land or currency) to
African-Americans have no incentive to make such self-defeating deci-
sions."84 Magee discusses how after the Civil War and during Recon-
struction, Congress decided to seize land fiom the wealthiest South-
erners and distribute forty acres to each adult former slave.Y5 Support
for the redistribution came from those who believed "the estab-
lishment of an African-Americanr economic base was critical to the
dissolution of the economic legacy of slavery.SG After two years of
lobbying, Congress created the Freedman's Bureau to distribute "cap-
tured and abandoned land."87 In January 1865, possessory title to
81 In July 1998, just before President Clinton's visit to China, the U.S. agreed to apologize
and bestow limited monetary reparations ($5,000) to Japanese Latin Americans ("JLAs") kid-
napped. from Latin American countries by the U.S. and placed in U.S. internment camps during
World War II. Previously, the government had refused to award reparations to theJLAs under
the Cil Liberties Act of 1988 on grounds that they were not U.S. citizens and had been in the
U.S. illegally. The settlement of theJLAs' class action lawsuit and the government's apology and
limited reparations brought mixed reactions. Some hailed the settlement as a "major ictory for
JLAs."John Tateishi, A Major VidoyforJIAs, PAcIFIC CmzEmJune 19-July 2, 1998, at 3. Others
called it a "bittersweet victory." Ao)agi, supra note 21. "Many would argue that JLAs in fact
endured much more suffering than what [U.S. Japanese Americans) went through," said the
attorney for dheJLAs, Robin Toma. "That's why I tink many people feel that it's a bitter pill to
swallow to take so much less than what tie [U.S. Japanese Americans] received." Id.
8'See Derrick A. Bell, Jr;, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convagence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523 (1980) [hereinafter Interest-Convergence Dilemma].
83 See Yamamoto, Sodal Meanings of Redress, sup-a note 4, at 230.
8 Magee, supra note 37, at 908.
r See id. at 886-88.
86 Id. at 887.
87 Id. at 888.
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-485,000 acres was awarded to 40,000 former slaves who immediately
began to settle and work the land.8 Later that same year, however, in
the face of rising Southern states' opposition to Reconstruction, Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson rescinded the land reparations program, or-
dered the black settlers to leave the occupied land and returned the
land to former Southern slave owners.89 Land reparations threatened
the nation's newfound peace. Therefore, the President scrapped the
program, assuring peace among the states, but at incalculable long-
term cost to former slaves.00
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 can also be
viewed through the lens of interest-convergence. The United States
agreed to pay one billion dollars and to return forty-four million acres
of land to Native Alaskans as reparations for the wrongful seizure of
lands.9' However, the primary impetus for reparations was the need to
clear land title for development of the Alaska oil pipeline. The United
States deemed the pipeline essential not only to its economic health
but also to national security. The Middle Eastern oil cartel controlled
oil supplies to the United States and was threatening to strangle the
American economy.92
Broadly conceived, the interest-convergence thesis' underscores
reparations ideology in these instances. While no one ideology controls
all situations, underlying systems of beliefs and values which serve
particular interests tend to shape whether, when and how reparations
will be awarded. At least two related strands of reparations ideology are
significant to our discussion. One involves the tension between race
and class; the other, the characterization of group "worthiness."
A race/class tension is manifested ideologically in the reparations
debate when opponents of reparations play the "class card" to defeat
racial reparations. How is this argument structured?93 These critics
argue that racial group reparations are overinclusive. Middle class
blacks, for example, will benefit to some extent even though they are
not economically disadvantaged. The critics conclude, therefore, that
8s See id at 88-9.
89 See id. at 889.
90 See id. at 888-89.
91 See Robinson, L, supra note 11. See also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43
U.S.C. § 1601 (1998).
9'- SeeJohn F. Walsh, Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 38 STAN. L. REv. 227,
229 (1985) (citing R. ARNoLD, ALAsKA NATivE LAND CIAMIS 93-144 (1976)).
93These ideas are developed and critiqued by Robert Westley in anothcr article in this
symposium issue. See generally, Robert Westley, lany Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the
Casefor Black Reparations?, in this issue, at 429.
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racial reparations make bad policy. Many of these critics of race-based
reparations, however, do not actually support economically tailored
reparations for historically oppressed groups. Instead, they use class
concerns to'mask hostility for reparations of any kind.
Similarly, opponents of racial reparations employ class to argue
underinclusiveness-that other economically disadvantaged groups
will be left out of a race-based reparations program. Here again, the
failure of these critics to support more expansive reparations for those
other groups belies their ideological use of class rhetoric.9
The second ideological strand is the characterization of group
worthiness. In an earlier article in this symposium, Chris Iijima traced
the Congressional debates precedingJapanese American redress. Poli-
ticians, lobbyists and media largely shaped crucial reparations argu-
ments around the cooperativeness of the internees, the heroism of the
442nd Regimental Combat Team and the "good citizenship" of Japa-
nese Americans during and after the internment.95 Mike Masaoka's
words, for example, were uplifted in the debates. Masaoka, the Execu-
tive Secretary and spokesperson of the Japanese American Citizens
League during the war, had urged acquiescence to the government's
internment orders as an act of patriotism.
I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese
ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more
fully the wonderful advantages of this Nation. I believe in her
institutions, ideals and traditions; I glory in her heritage ....
Although some individuals may discriminate against me I
shall never become bitter or lose faith, for I know such per-
sons are not representative of the majority of the American
people ....
Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me,
and because I have received innumerable benefits from her
I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times and in all
places, to support her Constitution, to obey her laws, to re-
spect her Flag, to defend her against all enemies, foreign or
domestic, to actively assume my duties and obligations as a
citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever,
94 Those who make class-based arguments to limit the scope of racial reparations to those
with financial need, and who are serious about supporting repanations in this fashion, raise
arguments deserving careful consideration.
9 Sce gener-ally Chris IUitna, Reparations and the "Model Mino i"Ideolog ofAcquiescence: The
Necessity to Refuse the Return to Oaiginal Humiliation, in this issue, at 285.
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on the hope that I may become a better American in a greater
America.96
With this and other testimonials as a backdrop, Congress, at least
in part, appeared to award redress for "deserving superpatriots." It
thereby refined the image of a model minority-those who are loyal
to and willing to sacrifice for the United States. 97 Congressman Robert
Matsui, a key player in Japanese American redress, reinforced this
point at a recent gathering of redress activists:
There could be no question about our patriotism after
people like Rudy [Tokigawa of the 442nd Regimental Combat
Team], who was locked up in camp, went to war for the U.S.
I don't think redress would have passed without the 442nd,
without those who gave up their lives and gave themselves for
the war effort while their families were internedP
The superpatriot/model minority vision was bolstered by Congress-
men Shumway (Japanese Americans are "some of the most respect-
able, hard working, loyal Americans that we have in this country"),
Brown (Japanese Americans are some of Colorado's "finest citizens
... some of our most honest, hardworking, and productive human
beings"), and Lehman (the bill for reparations will show "the re-
spect we all have for the contributions thatJapanese Americans have
made to our society")Y9
Most interesting, according to IUima's research, the Congressional
reparations debates avoided reference to Japanese American draft
resisters-those who refused to fight while their families were wrong-
fully imprisoned.100 The debates also failed to address the riots and
work and hunger strikes during which interned Japanese Americans
voiced discontent with internment conditions. 101 Throughout the in-
ternment, considerable disagreement existed within Japanese Ameri-
can communities over cooperation with and support for the govern-
ment-disagreements later ignored by the narrow framing of redress
discourse around Japanese American patriotism and sacrifice. 02
SId. at 399-400 n.42 (quoting 134 CONG. REc. H6308-09 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988)).
97See id. at 395.
OTakeshi Nakayama, Rare Victory of Spiit Over Nunbeas, RAv SH ,ipo, Sept. 16, 1997, at
Al.
0 fliina, supa note 95, at 393 n.25.
"00 See id. at 398.
101 See id. at 402-03.
t102See id. at 401-02.
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Framing reparations worthiness in terms of the superpatriot/
model minority served several interests. Certainly, and pragmatically; it
aided Japanese American internees-they received long-overdue repa-
rations. That framing also appears to have served the government's
practical and policy interests. Practically, it enabled the government to
award reparations to a relatively small number of "highly deserving"
Japanese Americans without opening the floodgates to reparations for
other racial groups. In terms of policy, it enabled the United States
unblushingly to tout democracy and human rights in its hard push
against Communism in the Soviet Union and Central Europe.
I supported Japanese American redress. Reparations were a well-
deserved and appropriate response to a horrendous violation of con-
stitutional liberties and to human suffering. Yet, difficult questions
about ideology bear asking. In the broadest sense, were reparations a
monetary buy-off of protest, an assuaging of white American guilt
without changes in mainstream attitudes and the restructuring of in-
stitutions? Were reparations a transactional exchange along the lines
of: "we'll admit you into the club for now if you don't challenge our
exclusion of others?" In my view, Japanese American redress will not
likely be seen by the mainstream and by other communities of color
as a buy-off, or an exclusive transactional exchange. But that danger
exists unless Japanese Americans now and tomorrow press for racial,
immigrant, gender, class and sexual orientation justice in the United
States.
The "danger lies in the possibility of enabling people to
'feel good' about each other" for the moment, "while leaving
undisturbed the attendant social realities" creating the under-
lying conflict.... [R]edress and reparations could in the
long term "unwittingly be seduced into becoming one more
means of social control that attempts to neutralize the need
to strive for justice."' 0 3
Inquiry into reparations ideology reveals this potential hidden dan-
ger of reparations; that leaving undisturbed the social structural
sources of racial grievance may neutralize "the need to strive for
justice."
103Yanamoto, Social Meanings of RedreA, supra note 4, at 232 (quoting Edmonds, Biyond
Prejudice Reduction, MCS CONCILIATION Q., Spring 1991, at 15).
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IV. A.FRICAN AMERICAN REPARATIONS CLAIMS
As developed more fully in the concluding section, I support
reparations for African Americans for a variety of reasons, including
the need to heal the continuing wounds of many African American
communities and to help repair the larger racial breach in the Ameri-
can polity. Others, including Robert Westley in this symposium, have
made compelling arguments for reparations based on the economic
and psychological harms of slavery, ofJim Crow violence and legalized
segregation and of continuing institutional discrimination. °4 With this
in mind, and drawing upon emergent lessons of Japanese American
redress, this section grapples with strategic obstacles to current African
American reparations claims.
A. LegalFraming
Most claims for African American reparations are framed by civil
rights law. The claims articulated by the National Coalition of Blacks
for Reparations in America (N'COBRA) are one example. Although
N'COBRA has several spokespersons at any given time, its main posi-
tions can be fairly characterized. N'COBRA cloaks its claims for African
American reparations in legal cloth. It grounds those claims primarily
in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and civil rights statutes
and, secondarily, in international law guarantees of equality and self-
determination. 05 N'COBRA!s strategy is to seek legislative or judicial
recognition of an existing legal entitlement to reparations. 06
1. Thirteenth Amendment
N'COBRA maintains there is no need to seek a Congressional
amendment to the Thirteenth Amendment to authorize reparations.
All that is necessary is enabling legislation to "put the already existing
104 See generally RICHARD F. AMIERICA, PAYING THE SOCIAL DEBT: WHAT WHITE AMERICA OWES
BL-CK AmERICA (1993); BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supa note 15; BrrrRER, supra
note 52; BLAcK MANIFESTO: RELIGION, RACISM, AND REPARATIONS (Robert S. Lecky &- Elliot
Wright eds., 1969);JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS,JR., FRobt SLAvERY TO FREEDOM: A
HisToRy OF NEGRO AM.'IERICANS (6th ed. 1988); Magee, supra note 37; Thomas F. Petigrew, New
Patterns ofRacis: iThe Different I Vrlds of1984 and 1964, 37 RurERS L. REv. 673 (1985); Verdun,
supra note 3; Westley, supra note 93.
10 5 See Nketchi Taifa, Reparations and SelfDetennination, in REPARATIONS YEsl: THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL REASONS WHY NEW AFRIKANs-BLACK PEOPLE IN NORTH AMIERICA-SHOULD BE
PAID Now FOR THE ENSLAVEMENT OF OUR ANCESTORS 1, 9-10 (Chokwe Lumumnba ed., 1989)
[hereinafter Taifa, Reparations and SelfDetermination, in REPARATIONS YES!].
06 See id. at 10.
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13th Amendment into effect. 10 7 For this reason, in 1987 N'COBRA
members drafted procedural legislation recognizing an existing Afii-
can American entitlement to reparations and creating the process for
"New Afrikan" sovereignty.03 Because the United States "has never
accorded ultimate political justice" to slaves and the descendants of
slaves, the draft legislation required that the federal.government hold
a plebiscite for African Americans. 09 Among other things, blacks could
vote to create a New Afrikan nation within the United States"0 that
would be supported by U.S. reparations payments of. three billion
dollars annually."'
The proposed implementing legislation faced immediate political
and legal obstacles. Politically, its unveiling revealed strong disagree-
ment among the American populace about black reparations. The
legislation also severely underestimated the logistical and financial
difficulties of a nationwide plebiscite involving African slave descen-
dants. Finally, the proposal overestimated African American desire to
consider seriously some form of independent black government. -12
Equally important;N'COBRA's narrow legal framing of an African
American entitlement to reparations under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was easily undermined. As interpreted by the courts, the Thir-
teenth Amendment forbids slavery. It does not, however, embody an
entitlement to reparations." 3 Congress now could elect to confer repa-
rations under the Amendment if it characterized past and current
living conditions for many African Americans as "badges of slavery."
Procedural legislation to implement a pre-existing" entitlement appears
unavailing.
107 Id.
103Entifled an "Act to Stimulate Economic Growth in the United States and Compensate, in
part, for the Grievous Wrongs of Slaveryand tle Unjust Enrichment Which Accrued to the United
States Therefrom," the proposed legislation was submitted to Congress by Professor Inari
Abubakari Obadele and Attorney Chokwe Lumumba. See REPARATIOS YEs! 67-76 (Chokwe
Lumumba ed., 1989).
109M. at 67.
n0 Id. at 71-74. N'COBRA's approach requires all African Americans ("Aflikans") to deciie
whether to accept de U.S. government's offer of citizenship. Affikans must decide either to
(1) accept U.S. citizenship; (2) return to a country in Africa; (3) emigrate to a country outside
Africa; or (4) create a New Afrikan nation-state in America. See id. at 73-74.
111 See id. at 70, 72-73.
112 See Frederick D. Robinson, Internal Change Needed, Reparations Not the Anrserfor Afiican
Aninicans, ATLANTA J., January 29, 1997, available in 1997 WI 3951781. The African American
author calls the demand for the creation of an independent black state in the Deep South, and
requests for funding for "back-to-Africa" missions, "silly demands [which] make a mockery of the
issue." Id.
13 See, eg., Cato v United States, 70 F.d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir: 1995); Hohri v. United States,
586 F. Supp. 769, 782, ajfd, 847 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir 1988).
40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 477
2. Civil Rights and Torts Claims Act
In the summer of 1997, N'COBRA announced a contemplated
class action reparations lawsuit on behalf of all descendants of formerly
enslaved Africans in America against the federal and state govern-
ments. A litigation committee comprised of lawyers, scholars, social
scientists and community activists is researching possible legal claims
and assessing political strategies. Traditional civil rights and tort claims,
along with novel claims such as claims under the Fair Housing Act, are
under consideration.'14
The problems of a civil rights/tort claims litigation approach to
reparations are revealed in the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Cato v. United
States."5 Cato consolidated two pro se lawsuits. Jewel,Joyce, Howard and
Edward Cato and Leerma Patterson, Charles Patterson, and Bobbie
TriceJohnson filed "nearly identical complaints.., against the United
States for damages due to the enslavement of African Americans and
subsequent discriinination against them, for an acknowledgment of
discrimination, and for an apology."" 6 Specifically, the complaint
sought compensation of:
14See Interview with Adrienne Davis, Professor of Law, Litigation Committee member; in
Miami, Fla. (May 9, 1998).
11;70 .Sd 1103. See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legisla-
tion, 50 MicH. L REv. 1323 (1952). Himiya v. United States is relevant to Cato. SeeNo. 94 C 4065,
1994 AL 376850 (N.D. IIl., July 15, 1994). Himi)-a sued the United States for "aiding, abetting
and condoning the institution of slavery" and alleged that the "institution of slavery cauted
African Americans to lose their language, religion, culture and history." Id. at *1. Himiya sought
"twenty million dollars in punitive damages, 150 acres of tax-cxempt land of his choice, free health
care coverage for the remainder of his life, costs necessary to trace his personal genealogy, and
costs necessary to legally change his name." )'d. The district court dismissed Himiya's claims,
finding them barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In addition, the court dismissed his
claim tinder the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (negligence or w'ongful act of an
employee of government), because he did not "and cannot allege any wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office." Id. As in Cato,
die court concluded with a hint of regret:
Although it is extremely regrettable that this country's history, as well as the
history of many other countries, includes a significant history ofslavery, the plaintiff
does not have proper standing under the law to recover damages for this reprehen-
sible time period. Instead, the citizens of the United States, acting through their
congressional representatives, have determined that the remedy has been provided
by the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well
as our federal civil rights statutes.
Id. at "2.
1t1 Cato, 70 ERd at 1105. Cato is a consolidation of two nearly identical complaints filed in
fornia pauperls. The district court dismissed the complaints in both cases, with prejudice, as
groundless prior to service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), but left open the opportunity to
refile the action as a paid complaint. Id. at 1105 n.2.
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$100,000,000 for forced, ancestral indoctrination into a for-
eign society; kidnapping of ancestors from Africa; forced la-
bor; breakup of families; removal of traditional values;.depri-
vations of freedom; and imposition of oppression, intimid-
ation, miseducation and lack of information about various
aspects of their indigenous character.1 7
The complaint also requested that the "court order an acknow-
ledgmefnt of the injustice of slavery in the United States and in the
[thirteen] American colonies between 1619 and 1865, as well as of
the existence of discrimination against freed slaves and their de-
scendants from the end of the Civil War to the present."" 8 Finally,
and related to the acknowledgment, the complaint asked for a
formal apology from the United States."0
Plaintiffs' initial complaint thus described, in general terms, the
horrors of slavery and current black/white disparaties in employment,
education and housing. The district court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a legal claim. On appeal, the plaintiffs' attorneys en-
deavored to recast the reparations claims in narrow civil rights and tort
law terms. Even that constricted framing, however, fell short. Thresh-
old procedural obstacles, including standing, subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and the statute of limitations, blocked plaintiffs' reparations
claims at every turn.
In affirming dismissal of the complaint, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals first noted that the district court described the suit as
"patterned after the reparations authorized by Congress for individuals
of Japanese ancestry who were forced into internment camps during
WTII." 2 0 The court then* expressed empathy for the suffering slavery
inflicted upon African Americans. It nevertheless agreed with the fol-
lowing statement of the district court, finding that there was. no legally
cognizable claim:
Discrimination and bigotry of any type is intolerable, and
the enslavement of Africans by this Country is inexcusable.
This Court, however, is unable to identify any legally cogniza-
ble basis upon which plaintiff's claims may proceed against
the United States. While plaintiff may be justified in seeking
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redress for past and present injustices, it is not within the
jurisdiction of this Court to grant the requested relief.'
The Ninth Circuit therefore concurred with the district court's
conclusion that "the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the
appropriate forum for plaintiffs grievances." 22
More specifically, the court held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Federal Torts Claims Act claims because the Act only
applies to claims against the United States accruing after January 1,
1945 and to claims brought within two years of accrual. 123 The court
concluded that the Act did not provide a waiver of the United States'
sovereign immunity from slavery-related damage claims accruing in
the 1800s.124 The court also implied that even if the Act did operate
as a waiver of governmental immunity, the statute of limitations would
have undermined African American damage claims based on the
harms of slavery and legalized segregation.125
Moreover, the court rejected the possibility of amending the plain-
tiffs' complaint in order to assert a civil rights statutory claim and a
Thirteenth Amendment reparations claim.12 6 The court adopted the
district court's reasoning that section 1981 (a) of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act 2 7 (pertaining to contractual relationships) does not waive the fed-
eral government's immunity from slavery-based claims.2 8 The court
also recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment does not authorize
individual damage claims against the government. 2 In addition, the
121 Cato, 70 F.Sd at 1105.
'1Id.
12 See id. at 1107.
1Id.
125 See id. at 1108.
I26 See id. at 1109. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment clothed "Congress wvith the power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolish-
ing all badges and incidents of SLAVERY in the United States." Cato at 1109 n.7 (quotingJones
vA Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968)).
127 The statute reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of tie United States shall have die same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like puni.slhment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no othe;
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1998).
12 8 See Cato, 70 F.2d at 1106.
I'., See id. at 1110. Citing Hohi, 586 F. Supp. at 782, the court concluded that the Thirteenth
Amendment itself does not provide grounds to sue for damages (i.e., it does not in and of itself
waive sovereign immunity), nor is it self-enforcing as to anything beyond the actual act of slavery.
In particular, the court held that the Amendment does not provide a right to damages on grotunds
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court observed that even a claim solely for non-monetary relief (apol-
ogy and acknowledgement) would not cure the complaint's deficien-
cies because (1) such a claim would be based on a "generalized, class-
based grievance" and would not implicate the conduct of any specific
official or program that caused a discrete injury, and (2) the individual
plaintiffs would lack "standing to litigate claims based on the stigma-
tizing injury to all African Americans caused by racial discrimina-
tion."130
Boris Bittker's thoughtful pro-reparations arguments also cast re-
parations claims narrowly as Section 1983 civil rights claims.13' In light
of a bevy of technical legal problems, however, Bittker limited the
claims to those arising from post-slavery discrimination against African
Americans. Bittker turned his focus away from the slavery era-a pe-
riod for which no living person is directly responsible-because ciil
rights slavery reparations claims against state and local officials create
insurmountable legal hurdles that "stultif[y] the discussion. '"132 He ar-
gued that post-Civil War wrongs against blacks were sufficient to sup-
port present-day reparations claims. 3 3
Derrick Bell criticized Bittker for succumbing to narrow civil rights
legalisms.'m First, by framing reparations as civil rights claims, African
Americans still faced the legal obstacle of U.S. sovereign immunity.
Second, by purposefully excluding claims for the entire period of
slavery "there is a tactical loss[;] ... setting this voluntary limitation
on coverage sacrifices much of the emotional component that provides
the moral leverage for black reparations demands."'135 The narrow legal
of Congress' failure to act. See DONALD E. Liv'Em.L PHOEBE A. HADDON, DOROTHY E. ROBERTS,
RUSSEL. L. WAVEER, CONSTITUTIONAL I-Aw: CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES 444-45 (1996).
130 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1109-10.
131 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute... of any state or Territory, subjects
...- any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights.., secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
132 BiTTxER, supra note 52, at 9.
193 See Bell, Disseaion ofa Drean, supra note 54, at 158. See also BITTKER, supra note 52, at
9-10.
13 4 See Bell, Dissection of a Dream, supra note 04, at 158.
1351d. In a footnote, Bell commented that Bittker might have explored the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments as alternatives to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 as a jurisdictional basis for a
federal reparations suit. Id. at 159 n.14. Bell also commented on the anticipated challenges to
the use of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and concluded that "[wihehlier based
on section 1983 or directly on constitutional amendments, reparations litigation, ifattempted on
a broad scale, faces an avalanche ofprocedural problems, including determining proper parties,
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framing robbed the reparations claims of the heart'of African Ameri-
can suffering-the continuing effects of slavery. For Bell, Bittker's
"exploratory surgery" of African American reparations "predictably
exposes some serious legal and political difficulties while giving little
attention to the pressures, moral and political, that, when applied by
those whose faith in a cause exceeded their belief in the law, have
spawned other legally [legislatively] acceptable reparations programs
in this country and elsewhere." 3 6
Legal obstacles, such as the statute of limitations, justiciability and
causation, precluded Gato's actual claims and undermined N'CO-
BRA's draft legislation as well as Bittker's post-slavery civil rights argu-
ments. The traditional common law paradigm of a legal claim, an
individual wrongfully harmed by the specific actions of another in the
recent past to recover demonstrable personal losses, did more than
subvert legal claims for African American reparations. The traditional
paradigm's limitations also deprived the claims of their historical force
and obscured their significance for a racially divided America.
3. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law is also a potential, albeit problem-
atic, source of legal claims. In 1998, the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights determined that the United States violated interna-
tional law through one of its court's racially discriminatory treatment
of William Andrews, an African American man convicted of murder in
1974 and executed in 1992.137 The Commission's decision centered
on a Utah court's conviction and death penalty sentencing of Andrews
despite ample evidence of a jury member's overt racial bias.'-3 The
fashioning an appropriate class action, and effecting meaningful discovery, all of which are likely
to increase in complexity as the case proceeds." Id.
1361d. at 157-58 (citing Bittker's detailed discussion of the Indian Claims Commission and
Germany's Federal Compensation Lia, under which West Germany paid reparations to Nazi
victims).
tl3 In Andrews v. United States, Report No. 57/96, Case No. 11.139, OEA/ser/L.V.II.98, doc.
7 rev. (1998), William Andrews was convicted in Utah state court for the torture slayings of three
people during an armed robbery, despite questions regarding the extent of his involvement in
the killings. In 1973, Andrews, Pierre D. Selby and Keith Roberts robbed a stereo shop. Andrews
and Roberts were outside the shop when Selby forced five people to drink drain cleaner; assaulted
and shot them. See id.
3851d. at 44. The Commission considered evidence that whilejurors were sitting at lunch in
a local restaurant during the guilt phase of Andrews' trial, one of the jurors had handed the,
court bailiff a drawing on a napkin depicting a stick figure hanging from a gallows with the words,
"Hang the Niggers." The trial court made no effort to investigate the origins of the note, or who
on therjury had seen it. The court merely admonished the jury io "ignore communications from
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Commission's 1998 report on the case recommended that "[the
United States... provide adequate compensation to Mr. William An-
drews' next of kin for... violations" of Andrews' right to life and
equality under law, his rights to an impartial healing and his right to
protection from cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment, pursuant to
Articles I, II and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man. 3 9
International human rights law is significant because of its articu-
lation of global norms of governmental behavior. It is problematic
because of ihe difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcement of those
norms in state and federal courts in the United States. The United
States is a member of the Organization of American States, which
operates the Commission, and is bound by the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man. Despite the Commission's findings
in Andrews,140 the U.S. refused to comply with the Commission's rec-
ommendations, maintaining that "Mr. Andrews received an impartial
trial free of racial bias.... [The U.S.] cannot agree with the Commis-
sion's findings, or carry out its recommendations." 141 Without signi-
ficant political intervention, the U.S.'s refusal to formally recognize the
international law decision ended the case. Neither the state nor federal
courts have jurisdiction to enforce the Commission's decision.
My aim in identifying the obstacles to reparations claims raised by
narrow legal framing is not to discourage the assertion of legal claims
for reparations or the identification of legal bases for reparations.
These tasks are necessary because reparations are bestowed through
some formal instrument, and law (whether legislation, court pro-
nouncement, executive order or international protocol) provides a
recognizable vehicle. The tasks are also important because law and
legal process, independent of formal outcome, can serve as generators
of "cultural performances." They can provide an institutional public
forum for calling powerful government and private actors to account.
They can offer opportunity to develop and communicate counter-nar-
foolish people." Id. at 5. Moreover, the Commission found that Andreusn s "tried by an all white
jury some of whom were members of the Mormon Church and adhered to its teachings tiat
black people were inferior beings." Id. at 44-45.
139 See id. at 49.
140The Commission found that die United States violated Andrews' right to life, right to
equality at law, rights to an impartial hearing and not to receive cruel, inlamous, or unusual
punishment pursuant to Articles I, It and XXVI, respectivel; of the American Declaration of
Rights and Duties of Man. Id.
141Id. at 50.
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ratives to prevailing stories about minority communities. And they can
help focus community education and political organizing efforts 42
My point is that clainis of legal entitlement are integral to a
reparations movement; they should not, however, be the primary em-
phasis of a reparations strategy. Legal claims and arguments need to
be carefully framed and employed in light of their limitations in order
to further the movement's larger political goals. Thus, although the
international commission's decision in Andrews may be unenforceable
in the U.S., if aptly framed and publicized, it may serve the reparations
movement's larger political goal of recasting doinestic civil rights
claims as international human rights claims.43 The concluding section
of this article sets forth an alternative look at strategic framing.
B. Dilemma of Reparations
Earlier I introduced the dilemma of reparations as part of the
darker side of the transformative potential of reparations. When repa-
rations are taken seriously they tend to recreate victimhood by inflam-
ing old wounds and triggering regressive reaction. In a recent study,
Jewish recipients of German reparations for Holocaust horrors attest
142 See generally Yhmamoto, Citltural Performane supra note 58. This political/culturnl ap-
proach to law and legal process also serves as a foundation for environmental justice theory. See
generally Luke Cole, Empoveriment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environ-
mental Poverty Lar, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
I43 Haunani-Kay Taask asserts that the United States has deprived Native Hawaiians of their
nation and land and denied the Hawaiians' right to self-determination as a people, including
control over aboriginal lands and natural resources. HAUNANI-KAY TRasK, FROM A NATIVE
DAUGHTER: COLONIAL S AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWA1'i (1993). These deprivations, she asserts,
are violations of Articles 15, 17,20, and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article
1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 1 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 20 of the American Convention
on Human Rights. Id. at 34-36.
One example of the use of international law in domestic litigation is Kealoha v. Hee, Civil
No. 94-0118-01 (1st Cir Haw., amended complaint filed Feb. 2, 1994). The plaintiffs sought to
enjoin negotiations, settlement, and the execution of release by trustees of tie Office of Hawaiian
Afiairs "concerning claims against the United States for tie overthrow of die Hawaiian govern-
ment in 1893, and dte redress of breaches of the ceded lands trust committed by the United
States and the State of Hawaii." Id. at 2. One of the claims asserted was that "it would violate the
right to self-determination under international law (to do othersdse)." Count V of the Amended
Complaint specifically addressed the alleged "Violation of International Law." It located Native
Hawaiians' rights of self-determination in, among other things: tie International Covenant of
Civil Political Rights, Articles I, If, and XXVII, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (ratified by
United States on Sept. 8, 1992); the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, dated
August 21, 1993, prepared by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations and submitted to
the United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights; the Universal Declat-ation of Htman
Rights; and general principles of international law. See Amended Complaint, at 20-26.
Some Af'ican American reparations claims asserted tinder international law are based on
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to these problems.14 4 In the current movement for African American
reparations, the potential victimization and backlash are apparent.
N'COBRA adopted a confrontational approach at its inception in
1987.145 With its support for a New Afrikan nationalism, N'COBRA
recalls a kind of 1960s black nationalism 4 6 then feared by many in the
American mainstream. Some find N'COBRA's approach now bracing,
a wake-up call. Others twist lingering fears of black nationalism into a
particular kind of backlash; for example, the "'[t] alk of healing and
reparations to African-Americans has provided the [Klu Klux] Klan
with a recruitment tool in a time of decline."214 7
Democratic Representatives John Conyers of Michigan and Tony
Hall of Ohio have taken a kinder and gentler political and moral
approach to African American reparations. Each year since 1989 Cony-
ers has introduced legislation proposing an African American repara-
tions study commission patterned after the study commission that
uncovered facts essential to Japanese American reparations.143 The
proposed commission, however, has received little congressional or
presidential support.14 9 In June 1997, Hall introduced a highly contro-
versial resolution calling for a simple United States apology to African
Americans for slavery.150
The N'COBRA and Conyers calls for African American repara-
tions and the Hall apology resolution generated three types of negative
reaction. First, much of the swift public opposition to Hall's proposed
resolution was steeped in hate and denial.'5' The calls reopened old
slavery and are "presented in the context of the United States' having denied (Aflican Americans]
the exercise of [their] right to selfdetermination." Imari Abubakari Obadele, Reparations, Yes!:
A Suggestion Tovard the Framewodr of a Reparations Demand and a Set of Legal Undapinnings, in
REPARATIONS YES!, slpra note 108, at 51.
144 See generally CHRISTIAN PROSs, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS
FOR SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR (1998) (describing ways in which Jewish survivors
of Nazi atrocities felt re-victimized by the reparations process).
145 See H. Rhalif Khalifah, Reparations: A War Issu4 ENCOBRA: N'COBRA NEWSLETTER,
Summer 1995, at 22 ("[r]eparations should always be presented as a militant, strong, uncompro-
mising issue").
14 0 See Diego Bunuel, Blad Power Day Provides Motivation; Raqly Focuses on Efforts to Bing
About Changes, SuN SENTINEI, (Ft. Lauderdale, FL),July 26, 1998, at 3B, available in 1998 WL
12824356.147Wes SmitI, Weahened KKKLooks to Recruits, LAS VEGAS Rmv-J., July 20, 1997, available in
1997 WL 4549302.
148 SeeSon)a Ross, Clinton Considers Apologyfor Slavey, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc.;June 17,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 4588826.
149 See id.
150 See Caitlin Rother, Should an Apology for Slavery be Made? Afiican-Amedicans Have Mixed
Opinions, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRiB., Aug. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3148674.
151The backlash to Hall included hundreds of letters and phone messages, most condemning.
his resolution, often with harsh racial language.
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wounds. Second, for some, the calls for an apology and reparations
reinscribed victim status.
I don't believe that we are so scarred by our history that we
are incapable of finding creative ways to advance. Indeed, it
is our endless preoccupation with governmental redress that
partly robs us of the energy to find solutions to our problems.
It enslaves us. As long as we sit around waiting on others to
do for us what we should be doing for ourselves, nothing will
ever get done. 52
In addition, for some, the calls for reparations also painted blacks
as pandering and overreaching. "Why should average tax-paying
Asian Americans or Hispanic Americans or even European Ameri-
cans (whose forebears [sic] owned no slaves) be asked to pay repa-
rations to all black Americans, including the most wealthy?' 53 Some
One man wvrote that the government should apologize to him for stripping his
great-grandfather of his 435 slaves. Some said Africa'n Americans should be thankful
that slave traders rescued their ancestors from Africa. Others argued that their
ancestors are immigrants who had no connection to slavery or that, beginning with
the 350,000 Union soldiers who perished in the Civil 'ar the nation has done more
than enough to atone for slavery.
Michael A. Fletcher; For Ameicans, Nothing is Simple About MakingApologyforSlaveDy; Congress-
man s Suggestion Draws Fire from All Sides, WASH. Posr, Aug. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12879800. Political scientist Andrew Hacker observes that Hall's proposed apology for slavery:
raises all sorts of emotions[.] Many white people don't want to hear any more
obligations that have not been filfilled. People say, "[w]e.have done everything we
have to do. We have affirmative action. We supported civil rights. Don't call us
anymore." I sense a lot of that feeling out there.
Id..
1'2 Robinson, F., supra note 112. According to Edgar Hunt, a N'COBRA member; "Native
Americans, the Eskimos andJapanese got reparations for what tie American government did to
diem, why can't we?"
.Barbara Coope; a Tennessee state representive, expressed similar sentiments regarding the
issue of reparations: "There have beenreparations for other groups to help keep them afloat.
We (blacks) are just as much a part of this country as anyone else, so there is no reason that
blacks should not receive reparations, also." Chandra M. Hayslett, Clinton Panel on Black Repa.
rations Sought, Comm. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), June 28, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL
11959623.
1'5 joseph Perkins, Reparations for Blads are the Wrong Aimver, LAS v'EAS REv.-J., Feb. 19,
1997, at 2, available in 1997 WI 4537651. Perkins argues that:
[T] he reparationists make their strongest case when they argue that the 30 percent
of black Americans who remain mired in poverty may be suffering the residual
effects of slavery 120 years later. Fair enough. But helping these 9 million or so
black Americans-whom Harvard social scientist William Julitts Wilson termed the
."trtly disadvantaged"-is best accomplished not by cutting $400,000 reparation
checks to these poor black families (which, no doubt, would be squandered like
lottery checks), but by completely dismantling the $250-billion-a-year governent-
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blacks reacted by saying that reparations claims unnecessarily mis-
cast blacks as continuing targets of government mistreatment when
blacks in the past have benefitted from Urban Renewal, Model
Cities, Community Block Grants, Urban Development Action
Grants, Enterprise Zones, Empowerment Zones and affirmative ac-
tion.154
The third type of negative reaction came from the other direction.
It addressed the perceived inadequacy'55 of Conyers' study commission
approach-that this approach did not go far enough because it initially
asked only for a study, and that even if individual monetary payments
resulted, those payments would be mere tokens. "[R] eparations [need
to] come in a lump sum that would be funneled into the educational
system, social programs or loans for first time home buyers."'15 6
Joe Singer asked, "[w]ill reparation[s] right a wrong" or- "will it
create further victimization of the oppressed group" thus exacerbating
the wound?5 7 Some will answer affirmatively to the first question, some
affirmatively to the second, and some will say yes to both. The dilemma
of reparations, revealed here, argues not for retreat by reparations
proponents in light of ambiguous support and likely backlash, but for
tactical anticipation.
C. Ideology of Reparations
I introduced Derrick Bell's broadly conceived interest-conver-
* gence thesis in Section III C of this article. According to Bell, African
Americans will only receive reparations for slavery when reparations
serve white Americans' larger political or economic interests. Bell
believes that ordinarily "[s]elf-interested whites who must make the
ultimate decision on whether or not to transfer property (land or
controlled welfare plantation, on which far too many poor black families are reliant.
In its place should be an empowerment system, which encourages and re-ards
legitimate child birth, fimily cohesion, education, work and entrepreneurship.
These are the keys to upward mobility in America, as the thriving, successful black
middle and upper-middle classes have proven.
Id.
154 SeRobinson, E, supra note 112.
355Tony Hall's proposed apology also received some negative reaction stemming from its
perceived inadequacy See Fletche; supra note 151.
15 Rother, supra note 150, at 4. In response to the Hall apology resolution, ReverendJesse
Jackson commented: "[i]t is like you drive over somebody with a ca; leave the body mangled,
then you decide to come back later to apologize ivith no commitment to help them get on their
feet. There is something empty in that. It is just more race entertainment." Fletcher, supra note
151.
'
57Singer, supra note 60, at 3.
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currency) to African-Americans have no incentive to make such self-
defeating decisions.""'s The interest-convergence thesis does not mean
that African Americans must subordinate their interests to those of
white Americans. Rather, it means that blacks must devise a reparations
strategy that primarily serves African American interests while further-
ing, or appearing to further in some important way, mainstream inter-
ests. Those interests, as traditionally described, include the United
States' international and domestic reputation on human rights issues,
peace in Anerican cities and bolstering the American economy.15 9
From this vantage point, until mainstream America perceives self-
interest in N'COBRA's position or the Conyers/Hall legislation, the
political movements for reparations will have little resonance."'6 As one
commentator observes:
[w]e could organize 'til the cows came home and make a
unified, resounding demand for reparations, and Ijust don't
think that in this climate it would be taken seriously.... This
is not a black question. This is a white question. The question
ought to be: "What will bring whites to apologize for the sin
and the crime of slavery and to make the just recompense for
it?"161
Tellingly, Representative Conyers did not expect to find support for
an apology to African Americans in the current Republican-majority
Congress. 62
In America's volatile racial climate, supporters of African Ameri-
can reparations have yet to frame a compelling interest-convergence.
5 5IMagee, supra note 37, at 908.
15 9 See Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, suprw note 4, at 231; Bell, Interest.Convergenc
Dilemma, supra note 82, at 524; Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Impelative, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 61, 113-14 (1988).
'6The Reverendjesse Jackson has attempted to lay an interest-convergence foundation for
Arican American reparations. In one instance, he commented that an apology by President
Clinton to African Americans would not be enough, and that the United States would also have
to pay reparations. ReverendJackson then
praised an effort by President Clinton, who is preparing for a trade mission to
southern Africa. He noted that the United States is seeking better trade relations
with southern Africa, an effort he considered unprecedented. "The U.S. has inter-
ests in southern Africa, and southern Africa has an interest in shoring up its trade
relations with America. So this is not a gift but an investment in Africa," Mr.Jackson
said, comparing the effort to the MIarsall Plan for Europe after World War If.
Harold McNeil, Baptist Gathefing HeaisJadason Call for Return to Activism, Burr. Nsws, Aug. 7,
1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 6453116.
lrl Robinson, L., supra note 11.
162 See id.
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Proponents of a confrontational black nationalism in the 1960s coa-
lesced with anti-war and social justice activists and spurred mainstream
accommodation in the form of affirmative action and government
entitlements. N'COBRA's black nationalism takes the position that the
reparations movement is a "war" and should always be presented as
"militant, strong, [and] uncompromising.'1 3 This aggressive approach
to reparations in post-civil rights era America, however, has played out
quietly for the most part. N'COBRA has not attracted the kind of
kinetic community and media attention once garnered by James For-
man, Malcolm X and the Black Panthers. The 1960s black nationalism
in the streets and schools created a sense of urgency in mainstream
America; its 1990s version is comparatively unobtrusive.
Nor has the Conyers study commission approach appealed to the
now politically conservative American mainstream. This approach
adopts the blueprint forJapanese American redress. In 1988, based on
a congressional commission's recommendations and in light of the
court rulings in the coram nobis cases, the United States paid $20,000
to each japanese American internee survivor, totaling over $1.6 billion
dollars. The payments, although substantial, were a small blip on the
radar of the American economy. By contrast, similar reparations for
African Americans would impact the economy: 20 million descendants
of Africans enslaved in the United States between 1619 and 1865,
multiplied by $20,000, would total 400 billion dollars in reparations.
Opponents of African American redress are likely to cite these figures
in playing the class card. Tapping into public concerns about expen-
diture of taxpayer dollars, they will argue both the overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness of iacial reparations; overinclusive in that some
not economically disadvantaged will benefit, underinclusive because
other needy groups will be left out.
Also, in contrast with Japanese American redress, African Ameri-
can interests in reparations are not as easily squared with mainstream
America's current interests. First, when Japanese Americans received
reparations the United States was fighting to win the Cold War and
needed to be perceived as liberators. Although the United States re-
cen.tly has sought to expand its political influence into China, the
Middle East and central Europe,'0 an American interest internation-
163Kalifah, supra note 145, at 22.
164 SeeRobinson, L., supra note 11. See also Eric K. Yamainoto, Korematsu Relisited-Corecting
the Inyzustice ofEvt'aordinay Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time For a Better Accom-
inodation of National Securiy Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SATA CLARA L. Rtv. 1 (1986).
leSSee George Melloan, China'r Balance of Power Politics in Asia, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 20, 1997,
at AIS, available in 1997 WL 2406221 (linking President Clinton's visit to China with U.S. political
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ally in African American "liberation" through reparations has not been
clearly articulated. There also has been no development of a cogent
vision of far-reaching domestic benefits for the American polity.
Second, politicians from both parties, lobbyists and media shaped
the debate on reparations for Japanese Americans so that Congress
ultimately bestowed reparations upon a "worthy" racial minority-the
"superpatriotic" even in the wake of oppression, the "model minority"
that pulled itself up by the bootstraps. 66 Chris Iijima characterized this
reparations narrative as a celebration of "blind obedience" to injus-
tice. 67 This narrative, he suggests, sent a pointed ideological message
to those subject to racial and other forms of aggression in America-be
"patriotic," do not complain, succeed on your own and you may be
rewarded later. Or, conversely, if your group's "character" marks it as
"unworthy," do not come to Congress seeking reparations.'
Thus, although the moral justification forJapanese American re-
dress applies many times over to African American claims, the econom-
ics and rhetorical strategies of 1980sJapanese American redress do not
translate readily into African American reparations in a conservative
political environment. How African American reparations proponents
handle superpatriot/model minority narrative and its linkage to the
social justification for reparations may be key, particularly in light of
the Republican Party's casting of African Americans in recent years as
undeserving of "special" government benefits.169 Will the rise in overt
white racism, the abolition of affirmative action, glass ceiling discrimi-
influence on China's potential for manufacturing high value weapons such as submarines and
nuclearweapons); Marianne Means, Scandal Bacflre: Don't Conclude Clinton is in China'sPodc,
DAYroN DArLY NEws, Ma; 22, 1997, at 15A, available in 1997 WL 3931950 (noting that with
President Clinton's visit to China "[p]owerful economic interests are at stake..., represented
by companies with %ast political influence whose overseas trade translates into jobs for thousands
of voters"); Edith M. Ledere; Group Says U.S. Shows Poor Leadership, ASSOCIATED PREss, Apr. 23,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6654746 (describing U.S. attempts to gain political influence in tie
Middle East and other world trouble spots by acting as peace maker and displaying leadership);
Jaimie Suchlicki, Forord, J. oF INTEtA A,ERicAN STUDIES & WORLD A'F., Mlal; 22, 1997, at 1,
available in 1997 WI 10714609 (criticizing U.S. preoccupation with China, Central Europe, and
the Middle East in attempts to obtain economic and political influence).
tvj See geneuilly Ijima, supra note 95.
167 See id.
IM See id.
169An article describes Decades of Distortion: The Right s 30-Year Assault on Welfare, a report
by Ntrtheastern Law Professor Lucy A. Williams, as "document[ing] the ability of political
conseratives to define welfare recipients as undeserving African American ... women." "Repub-
lican politicians and their intellectual allies often made direct connections between Affican
Americans, welfare and street crime, deteriorating neighborhoods, declining property values
[and] affirmative action."As a result, "die political right promoted a misleading image of welfare
as an entitlement for 'lazy' Black wom[e]n." Decades ofDistorlion: The Rightls 30-Year Assault on
lfare, N.Y. BEAcoN, Dec. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11708068.
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nation, the high black male incarceration rate and the cutbacks in
social programs and public assistance generate enough black anger
and mainstream anxiety to create a national interest in black repara-
tions? Will the "resegregation of America"--President Clinton's
words-detract from America's capacity to police global democracy
and thereby create impetus for black reparations? WillJapanese Aneri-
can redress beneficiaries disavow the singular superpatriot/model mi-
nority narrative of reparations worthiness and publicly support African
American justice claims? The ideology of reparations poses these ques-
tions to Japanese Americans, African Americans, other groups seeking
redress and the American polity as a whole.
In sum, at the turn of the millennium, how might the Af-ican
American reparations movement navigate its way through obstacles
generated by the narrow legal framing of reparations claims, the repa-
rations dilemma and the ideology of reparations? How might it trans-
late the moral power of its claims into politically viable action? There
is, of course, no single, encompassing answer. No magic words.
What I offer in the concluding section are not specific arguments
for African American reparations. Rather, I offer an altered conception
of reparations to assist in the formulation of those arguments as part
of a larger political strategy of "repair."
V. REPARATIONS AS REPAIR
Notwithstanding legal and political objections and the dilemma
and ideology of reparations, reparations have been offered and ac-
cepted in recent years. 7" The socio-psychological benefits of apologies
and reparations are often significant for recipients.'7 ' As previously
mentioned, one woman said the Japanese American redress process
had "freed her soul.1 172 Other beneficiaries responded with a collective
sigh of relief. Ben Takeshita, for instance, expressed the sentiments of
170 See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 9, *at 47-48.
t71According to clinical psychologist Susan Heitler, "lain apology is a much more complex
and powerful phenomenon than most people realize[.]" Fletcher, mtpra note 151. Additionally,
psychologist Susan T. Fisk observes,
An apology for slavery would say it may not have been me, but it was my people
or my government that did this and we now see that it xw-as really a crime and sin.
It is potentially healing. It shares responsibility for ending racism and it acknow-
ledges that slavery has some relevance to today.
Id. See also Sharon Cohen, Aineficans to be Compensated for Homois of Holocaust. Survivols Say
Reparations Won't End Nightmares, SAN DEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL
3126022 (for concentration camp survivor, "rieceiving reparations ... would be a psychological
boost").
1MYamamoto, Social feanings of Redress, supra note 4, at 227.
40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 477 S
many when he said that although monetary payments "could not begin
to compensate.., for his... lost freedom, property, livelihood, or the
stigna of disloyalty," the reparations demonstrated the sincerity of tie
government's apology.'7
In light of both the dangers and the transformative potential of
reparations, I offer two insights into specific reparations efforts, in-
sights drawn from.Japanese American redress that bear on the shape
of African American reparations claims and strategy. One is normative:
reparations by government or groups should be aimed at a restructur-
ing of the institutions and relationships that gave rise to the underlying
justice grievance. Otherwise, as a philosophical and practical matter,
reparations cannot be effective in addressing root problems of misuse
of power, particularly in the maintenance of oppressive systemic struc-
tures, or integrated symbolically int6 a group's (or government's)
moral foundation for responding to intergroup conflicts or for urging
others to restructure oppressive relationships. This means that mone-
tary reparations are important, but not simply as individual compen-
sation.. Money is important to facilitate the process of personal and
community "repair" discussed below.
A second insight is descriptive: restructuring those institutions and
changing societal attitudes will not 'flow naturally and inevitably.from
reparations itself. Dominant interests, whether governmental or pri-
vate, will cast reparations in ways that tend to perpetuate existing power
structures and relationships. Indeed, traditionally framed, American
interests in racial reparations, including international credibility and
domestic peace, tend to reinforce the social status quo.
Those seeking reparations need to draw on the moral force of
their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while simulta-
neously radically recasting reparations in a way that both materially
benefits those harmed and generally furthers some larger interests of
mainstream America. Moreover, those benefiting from reparations in
the past need to draw upon the material benefits of reparations and
the political insights and commitments derived from their particular
reparations process and join with others to push for bureaucratic, legal
and attitudinal restructuring-to push for material change. And their
efforts must extend beyond their own reparations to securing repara-
tions for others.
These insights point toward a refraining of the prevailing repara-
tions paradigm-a new framing embracing the n6tion of reparations
13NIcHOLAs TAVUCHIs, M I-x CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 107
(1991).
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as "repair." Indeed, reparation, in singular, means repain It encom-
passes both acts of repairing damage to the material conditions of
racial group life-distributing money to those in need and transferring
land ownership to those dispossessed, building schools, churches, com-
munity centers and medical clinics, creating tax incentives and loan
programs for businesses owned by inner city residents-and acts of
restoring injured human psyches-enabling those harmed to live with,
but not in, history. Reparations, as collective actions, foster the mend-
ing of tears in the social fabric, the repairing of breaches in the polity.
For example, slavery, Jim Crow apartheid and mainstream resis-
tance to integration inflicted horrendous harms upon African Ameri-
can individuals and their communities, harms now exacerbated by the
increasing resegregation of America.1 74 Reparations directly improving
the material conditions of life for African Americans and their corn-
munities are especially appropriate. In addition, the racial harm to
African Americans also wounded the American polity. It grated on
America's sense of morality (do we really believe in freedom, equality
and justice?), destabilized the American psyche (are we really oppres-
sors?), generated personal discomfort and fear in daily interactions
(will there be retribution?), and continues to do so. As Harlon Dalton
observes, "perpetuating racial hierarchy in a society that professes to
be egalitarian is destructive of the spirit as well as of the body politic."'75
Reparations for African Americans, conceived as repair, can help mend
this larger tear in the social fabric for the benefit of both blacks and
mainstream America.
So viewed, reparations are potentially transformative. Reparations
can avoid "the traps of individualism, neutrality and indeterminacy that
plague many mainstream concepts of rights or legal principles.'1 76
Reparations are grounded in group, rather than individual, rights.and
responsibilities and provide tangible benefits to those wronged by
those in power. As Mari Matsuda observes, properly cast, reparations
target substantive barriers to liberty and equality 77 In addition, cou-
pled with acknowledgment and apology, reparations are potentially
transformative because of what they symbolize for both bestower and
174 See generally AHDRmV HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLAcK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992).
175 HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTNG THE FEAR BETWEEN BLAcKS AND
WHITES 4 (1995).
176rMatsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 38, at 393-94.
177 See id. at 391. See also Magee, supra note 37, at 913 ("[r]eparations would be powerful
symbols of white group responsibility for the continued degradation of African-Anerican life and
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beneficiary: reparations "condemn exploitation and adopt a vision of
a more just world.' 178
For these reasons, some argue that reparations-in the sense
of repair rather than compensation-are essential to mending racial
breaches in the American polity. Manning Marable contends that the
post-Civil War Reconstruction eventually failed because the federal
government refused to support broad land grant reparations to African
Americans. 179 Without large-scale land redistribution (forty acres and a
mule), the emancipation, the Fourteenth Amendment and civil rights
statutes failed to uplift blacks socially and economically. Marable ob-
serves that because economic power was held by whites, equality in
political and social relations was an illusion. 80
As Marable implies, without change in the material conditions of
racial group life, reparations are fraught with regressive potential.
Without attitudinal and social structural transformation of a sort mean-
ingful to recipients, reparations may be illusory, more damaging than
healing. No repair. Cheap grace.
Native Hawaiians voice these concerns in their drive for repara-
tions. Hawaiians are seeking reparations from the United States and
the State of Hawai'i in the form of money, homelands and Hawaiian
self-governance.' 8' Repairing cultural wounds, restoring a land base
and altering governance structures are perceived by increasing num-
bers of Hawaiians as essential to functioning relationships among in-
culture"). Failure to engender such a transformation, Carl Rowan warns, may contribute to a race
w'ar
[T]he reason there is a danger of this black underclass engaging in a race war is
that they have no meaningful stake in the America that most whites and privileged
minorities know. People with a real stake in something of value are loath to piss on
it, let alone destroy it. But the mass of blacks can't get close enough to theAmerican
dream just to piss on it.
CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE VAR IN AIERICA: A VAKE-UP CALL 290 (1996). Rounn, an
aweard-winning journalist, sees deteriorating living conditions for many African Americans and
white provocation, such as the rise in hatemongering, the death of affirmative action, the decline
of government in providing for the social welfare, the criminalization of black youths and the
abandonment of inner city public schools, as a potentially combustable mix. See id.
173Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 38, at 394.
179See generally ALNNiG 'MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THnE SECOND RECON-
STRUCTioN IN BL.Acx AmERICA, 1945-1990 (2d ed. 1991).
180 See id. at 6.
18tA few legal claims for Hawaiian reparations have achieved some success. These claims
were resolvable in part because they were based on specific provisions in Hawaii's Constitution
that recognize the state's trust relationship with Hawaiians. SeeKa'ai'ai, Civil No. 92-3742-10 (1st
Cir. Ham , Oct. 1992) (after successfil lobbying by the core group, te 1995 legislature committed
$30 million a year for 20 years, $600 million total, to the Homelands Trust); Office of Hawaiian
Affaiis v. State of Hawai'i, Civ. No. 94-0205-01, appeal docketed, No. 20281 (1998). See also HAw.
CONST. art. 16, § 7; HAw. CO NsT. art. 12, § 4;.HAW. CONST. art. 12, § 7.
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digenous Hawaiians, the federal and state governments and their non-
Hawaiian citizens. Thus, while monetary compensation may be an
appropriate form of reparations in some instances, it is not, alone,
deemed sufficiently reparatory by most Hawaiians. For some, monetary
payment alone would not bring material change; it would likely gen-
erate only illusions of progress and "throwing money at old wounds
would do little to heal them.' 82
Symbolic compensation without accompanying efforts to repair
damaged conditions of racial group life is likely to be labeled "insin-
cere." For instance, despite modest monetary restitution, the Japanese
government's refusal to acknowledge responsibility for World War II
crimes or take active measures to rehabilitate surviving victims has
generated charges of insincerity and foot-dragging. For many, the
Japanese government's refusal to express regret undermines the pos-
sibility of forgiveness and prospects for healing."8 3 By contrast, Ger-
many's efforts to heal the wounds ofJewish Holocaust survivors extend
beyond monetary reparations. The German government has also un-
dertaken disclosure of war archives, passed legislation barring race
hatred, overhauled Holocaust educational materials and commemo-
rated war victims. 84
Reparations, as repair, therefore aim for more than a temporary
monetary salve for those hurting. Reparations are a vehicle, along
with an apology, for groups in conflict to rebuild their relationships
through attitudinal changes and institutional restructuring.', In terms
of changed attitudes, making apologies a part of a group's public
history-as the Southern Baptists did through their formal apology to
African Americans' 86-is one means of reparation. Committing to end
derogatory stereotyping of racial "others" is anothen In terms of dis-
mantling disabling social structures or supporting empowering ones,
reparations might mean, as in South Africa, the government's new
l"'2Magee, supra note 37, at 879 (citing subcommittee members, comment on Convers"
reparations study bill, Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.1.
1684, 102 Cong., (1991)).
183 See e.g., Tong Yui, Comment, Reparations for Fonne" Comfort Women of World War II, 36
HARs INT'L L.J. 528, 539 (1995).
184 See id. at 538 (citing 'Foigive Us": East Germany Faces the Truth, Apologizes for the Holo-
caust-A Profound First Act, NEvsDAY, Apr. 15, 1990, at 3).
I65 SeeJohn Stevens Keali'iwabamana Hoag, The Moral, Historical and Theorectical Frame-
work for Restitution and Reparations for Native Hawaiians 19 (Apr. 28, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file wvith author). Elazar Barkan observes that injured groups often seek to achieve
a more moderate goal than full retroactive justice, such as lessening conflict or improving their
economic condition. See Elazar Barkan, Paybad Thne: Restitution and the Moral Economy of
Nations, 11 TIKKUN, Sept. 19, 1996, at 52.
18G SeeVincent F.A. Golphin, Southern Baptists Apologizefor Past Racism, SYRACUSE HEtALD-J.,
July 1, 1995, at A10.
40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 477
struggling but active Reconstruction and Development Programme
aimed at redistributing land, changing education, health and housing
policies and establishing public and private affirmative action pro-
grams.187
This repair paradigm of reparations redirects attention away from
individual rights (recognized by law) and legal remedies (monetary
compensation). It focuses instead on (1) historical wrongs committed
by one group, (2) which harmed, and continue to harm, both the
material living conditions and psychological outlook of another group,
(3) which, in turn, has damaged present-day relations between the
groups, and (4) which ultimately has damaged the larger community,
resulting in divisiveness, distrust, social disease-a breach in the pol-
ity.188sWithin this framework, reparations by the polity and for the polity
are justified on moral and political grounds-healing social wounds by
bringing back into the community those wrongly excluded.18 9
How Japanese Americans respond to African American repara-
tions claims in the new millennium, and whetherJapanese Americans
187 See generallyJohn w. DeGruchy, The Dialectic of Reconciliation: Churd and the Transition
toDemocicry in South Afiica, inTHE RECONCILIATION OF PEOPLES: CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCHES
16 (Gregory Baum & Harold Wells eds., 1997).
1H See generaly Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 9. Mari Matsuda has proposed a legal
group-based, victim-conscious reparations model that generally embraces these ideas. The model
expands the narrow definition of a legal relationship to include victim groups, perpetrator
descendants and current beneficiaries. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 38, at 375.
Group damage brought about by past w~rongs provides a horizontal connection within victim
groups. See id. at 377. Group members think of themselves as a group because they are treated
as a group. For them, group experiences with racism and discrimination are "raw, close and real."
Id. at 379. A horizontal connection likeuise exists within the perpetrator group because dominant
groups have benefitted and continue to benefit from past wrongs, even if members of this group
dehy any personal involvement. See id.
The expanded paradigm also departs from the classical legal notions of time-bar and proxi-
mate cause. SeeMatsuda, Lookingto theBottom, supranote 38, at 381. Reparation itself is necessary
because a nation takes such a long period of time to recognize historical wrongs against a victim
group. Reparations claims are instead based upon ongoingstigma, discrimination and harm. See
id. at 381-82. A victim perspective offers an alternative time-bar. Under the expanded pamndigm,
"(tihe outer limit should be the ability to identify a victim class that continues to suffer a
stigmatized position enhanced or promoted by the iurongfnl act in question." .1d. at 385. And
where the continuing effects of the wrongs are acute, the passage of time should not be a waiver
of the wrong. See LW'RENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 38, at 240.
Matsnda suggests that victim group members should also participate in the identification of
those entitled to relief and the nature and disbursement of the reparation awards. See Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom, supra note 38, at 387. Consultation of victims respects their self-determi-
nation and personhood. See id. Under this expanded group-based legal paradigm, groups, both
victims and perpetrators, are thus treated collectively rather than individually. See id. at 380.
I89Seegenerally'JamES BOYD WViTE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF THE LAW 6 (1985).
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participate in the repair of other groups' wounds and the mending of
tears in society's fabric, may well determine the legacy of Japanese
American redress.
I,
